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Abstract
Slavery has been a major institution of labor coercion throughout history. Colonial societies
used slavery intensively across the Americas, and slavery remained prevalent in most countries
after independence from the European powers. We investigate the impact of slavery on long-run
development in Colombia. Our identification strategy compares municipalities that had gold mines
during the 17th and 18th centuries to neighboring municipalities without gold mines. Gold mining
was a major source of demand for slave labor during colonial times, and all colonial gold mines are
now depleted. We find that the historical presence of slavery is associated with increased poverty
and reduced school enrollment, vaccination coverage and public good provision. We also find that
slavery is associated with higher contemporary land inequality.
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1 Introduction
Throughout most of world history, labor repression of different forms has played a key role in shaping
the economic structures of society. In the classical world, for instance, probably 35% of the population
of Roman Italy were slaves (Bradley (1994, p. 12)), while 25% of the population of ancient Athens were
slaves (Morris and Powell (2006, p. 210)). Closer to our time, slavery has been even more prevalent
in some societies and has lasted until recently. In 1680 2/3 of the people on the Caribbean island of
Barbados were slaves (Dunn (1969)). In 1860 slaves still made up about 13% of the entire population
of the United States, and almost 50% of the population in the US South. In large parts of West Africa
slaves made up 50% of the population in the 19th century (Lovejoy (2000)), and in Sierra Leone slavery
was abolished by the British colonial state only in 1928.
Slavery was not of course the only form of labor repression. Though slavery vanished from Western
Europe in the early Medieval period1, it was replaced by feudalism where the serfs who made up
probably 90% of the population were also coerced and were subject to great restrictions on movement
and occupational choice. Elsewhere similar systems arose, for example in Ethiopia and India which
more or less resembled slavery. Russian serfdom, for example, allowed serfs to be sold just like slaves,
which was not characteristic of serfdom in Western Europe. This labor repression probably also had a
major impact on the economic development of these societies. Finlay (1965), for example, argued that
it was precisely the fact that the economy of the classical world was based on slavery which made it so
undynamic technologically. Slaves had little incentive to innovate or work creatively. Brenner (1976)
made a similar argument about the lack of technological change in feudal Europe. The consequences of
labor repression for economic development have perhaps been most intensively debated in the Americas.
A long intellectual tradition argued that the relative economic backwardness of the US South compared
to the rest of the country (in terms of income per-capita, urbanization, manufacturing industry, and
infrastructure) was directly a consequence of the slave economy (Genovese (1965), Wright (1978),
Bateman and Weiss (1981), Ransom and Sutch (2001)). This could be so even if slave production was
itself highly profitable (Fogel and Engerman (1974)) since slave plantations may have exerted all sorts
of negative externalities on the wider economy.
Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) placed labor repression at the heart of their comparative theory of
the long-run development of the Americas. In their argument, conditions conducive to crops which
exhibited economies of scale and could be profitably produced with slaves, such as sugarcane and
cotton, led to poor economic development in Latin America compared to North America. When a
society had such factor endowments it developed a very unequal hierarchical society which impeded
development.
Despite this plethora of hypotheses about the pervasive role of labor repression and slavery in retarding
economic development, there have been few systematic empirical studies. Neither Finlay nor Brenner
provided systematic evidence for their claims, while the work on the US South and that by Engerman
and Sokoloff has been at the level of broad correlation. Most notably, Dell (2010) examined the
long-run impact of the largest system of coerced labor used in colonial Latin America, the Andean
1The Doomesday Book, the great census of England conducted by the Norman king William the Conquerer recorded
that in 1086 about 10% of the population were slaves. By 1400 this was down to zero in England.
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mining mita in modern day Peru. Although the mita was abolished at independence, almost 200 years
ago, using regression discontinuity techniques she showed convincingly that in villages which today lie
within the former catchment area, average household consumption is 1/3 lower. She showed this was
due to less participation of primarily agricultural households in the market. A major difference is that
Dell focuses on a specific form of corvée labor, whereas we focus on slavery, which has been probably
more widespread across societies, time, and economic environments. This paper complements Dell
(2010) by studying the long-run implications of labor coercion, focusing both on the different type of
coercion (slavery instead of corvée labor) and a different source of variation.
We do so in the context of Colombia where the national census of 1843 (when the country was called
New Grenada) provides complete municipality level data on the incidence of slavery (the last before
slavery was abolished in 1851). We investigate the long-run impact of slavery in terms of current
development outcomes but also at two intermediate dates, 1918 and 1938. The biggest empirical
challenge in conducting such a test is that the location of slaves in 1843 was endogenous and determined
by the characteristics of municipalities which may be determinants of current development outcomes.
For example, the location of slaves might have been determined by agricultural productivity, or it
might have been more attractive to use slaves in places which were less healthy, or perhaps in places
which were more remote. In addition, the presence of slaves may have been correlated with other
important features, such as the presence and strength of state institutions, which are difficult to
control for but which persist and impact current development outcomes. The crux of the paper is
therefore our identication strategy. This is based firstly on the observation that in colonial Colombia
one predominant use of slaves was in gold mining (Colmenares (1973), Colmenares (1979), Jaramillo
(1974)). Nevertheless, by the mid 19th century gold production from deposits exploited during colonial
times was negligible. This does not, however, make the mere presence of colonial gold mining an
appealing instrument for slavery in 1843. This is because gold deposits (both vein and placer ones)
were not randomly distributed across the country, but rather concentrated in the basin of the Cauca
River, in the Upper Magdalena River valley, and on the Pacific Coast (West (1952)). Empirically this
is problematic because these gold-mining regions are also very different to other regions of the country
in several dimensions.
To solve this problem, we implement an empirical strategy in the spirit of a matching methodology
(Angrist and Pischke (2009)), and compare directly neighboring municipalities (municipalities sharing
a border), with and without colonial gold mines. These neighbors are likely to have faced similar
colonial state presence, and are likely to be very similar across any other unobservables. Moreover,
using neighbor-pair fixed effects, we can directly control for any unobservables that are common across
the boundary. Thus, the effect of slavery on current outcomes is identified by the variation in slavery
across neighboring municipalities with and without colonial gold mines.
Formally, our main specifications use the presence of a gold mine in the 17th and 18th centuries as
an instrument for slavery in a sample consisting of gold-mining municipalities and their neighbors
(and include a full set of fixed effects for each cluster of gold-mining municipality and its neighbors).
Our focus on the extensive margin of variation in slavery is motivated by two considerations. First,
the persistent effects of slavery are likely to be due largely to the institutional complex supporting
slavery. Second, our data provide only a noisy measure of the number of slaves in a municipality.
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We verify that the OLS correlation between contemporary outcomes and slavery is driven mostly by
the extensive margin. The clustered nature of our data raises some questions about inference. To
overcome this problem, we also implement an alternative strategy which includes random effects that
allow for a within-cluster and cross-cluster correlation structure for our sample of municipalities. Our
IV random-effects estimates are close to the IV neighbor-pair fixed effects estimates, and allow us to
be confident about the degree of precision of the effects we find.
Our basic finding is that across a comprehensive set of economic development indicators, slavery
has a robust negative effect. Slavery in 1843 is associated with greater poverty, lower educational
attainment, lower vaccination coverage, and lower public good provision in the form of aqueduct and
electricity coverage around the 1990s and 2000s. When looking at development outcomes in the early
20th century, we also find that slavery is associated with reduced literacy, educational attainment
and vaccination coverage. Moreover, slavery is also strongly associated with increased contemporary
land inequality. We find that the magnitude of the effects is economically important, and in line with
estimates from Dell (2010) who looks at an alternative coerced-labor institution. For example, relative
to the sample means, municipalities with slaves in 1843 have 23% higher poverty rates, 16% lower
secondary school enrollment rates, 33% less vaccination coverage, 15% less aqueduct coverage, and 5%
larger land Gini coefficients. Interestingly, historical slavery does not appear to have significant effects
on contemporary state presence measured by the size of public bureaucracies, tax collection or public
goods such as police posts, courts or health centers, or on contemporary sectoral specialization.
Though there has not been a convincingly identified study of the impact of slavery on economic devel-
opment, several papers have examined part of the issue. McLean and Mitchener (2003) showed that
at the level of US states the extent of pre-civil war slavery was negatively correlated with subsequent
economic growth. Lagerlof (2005) showed at the level of southern US counties that higher slavery in
1860 is strongly associated with lower income per-capita in the 1990s. He tackled the issue of the
endogeneity of slavery by instrumenting it with elevation above sea level, average annual temperature,
and precipitation (rainfall), but the use of such geographical instruments is problematic. Other related
work is by Canaday and Tamura (2009) and Alston and Ferrie (1993) who explore some mechanisms
of persistence of slavery in the context of the U.S. South during the “southern redemption” decades.
Canaday and Tamura (2009) study discrimination in education provision, while Alston and Ferrie
(1993) look at the emergence of paternalistic labor contracts between white landed elites and former
slaves and their descendants which, in their argument, retarded the adoption of welfare programs in
the South.
Bruhn and Gallego (2010) classified slavery during the colonial period of the Americas as a bad
type of economic activity which they showed, using cross-national and within-country variation, was
negatively correlated with contemporary GDP per-capita. Nunn (2008) also showed that within the
Americas there is a negative correlation between historical slavery and contemporary development
outcomes. Summerhill (2010), however, found using variation within the Brazilian state of Sao Paulo,
no correlation between the extent of slavery in 1872 and contemporary income-per capita or human
capital outcomes.
Others have used historical slavery as an instrument for various types of outcomes, though under
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exclusion restrictions that are likely to be violated. For instance Bashera and Lagerlof (2008) used
slavery as an instrument for human capital in a study of within US and Canada income variation.
Easterly and Levine (2003) and Easterly (2007) do this more indirectly using the presence of land suit-
able for growing slave crops like sugarcane and cotton as an instrument for institutions and inequality
respectively.
This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we provide a historical discussion of slavery and gold
mining in New Grenada during the colonial period. Section 3 presents the data collected and used in
this study, section 4 then discusses the empirical strategy, section 5 then discusses the main results
and explores the robustness of our findings, and section 6 concludes.
2 Slavery in Colombia
2.1 Conquest, Settlement, and Gold Deposits
In this section we discuss the historical background of slavery in Colombia. Our purpose is to motivate
our empirical strategy, which was to a large extent suggested by the historical experience of slavery
and gold-mining during the colonial period. The interest in precious metals, best exemplified by the
quest for Eldorado during the Spanish conquest of South America, was one of the driving forces in
the occupation and settlement of the Spanish colonies. In fact, most of the largest precious metal
deposits in the Americas were found shortly after the Spanish arrival. For example, the Potosí silver
deposits were discovered in 1545, while the first silver mines in Michoacán, Taxco, and Zacatecas in
Mexico, were found in 1525, 1534, and 1546, respectively (Bakewell (1971), Bakewell (1997), Dell
(2010), Wagner (1942), West (1952)).
In the northern Andes silver deposits are scarce, but gold deposits are much more abundant. As a
result, in New Grenada gold mines both from vein and placer deposits were also rapidly located by
Spanish conquistadors. Exploration of New Grenada started in the mid 1530s, and reports document
that by 1544 mining was well established in the upper Cauca River region. By 1547 Spaniards were
already aware of the rich gold deposits of Anserma and Cartago, 200 miles north of Cali down the
Cauca River (West (1952)). Finding precious metal deposits was one of the main motivations for the
initial exploration of the territory, which makes their rapid discovery unsurprising.
The distribution of gold deposits in New Grenada was determined by the geo-morphological features of
the northern Andes. These traverse the country from south to north, subdividing into three mountain
chains, namely the Western Cordillera, the Central Cordillera, and the Eastern Cordillera. The most
significant gold deposits are concentrated in three regions around the Andes: the drainage basin of
the Cauca River, flowing between the Western and Central Cordilleras, the upper Magdalena River,
flowing between the Central and Eastern Cordilleras, and the Pacific coast lowlands, running between
the Pacific Coast and the western slopes of the Western Cordillera (See Figure 2). The nature of the
gold deposits in these three regions also varies somewhat. Most of the gold deposits in the Pacific Coast
basin are placer deposits, located along the riverbeds that flow down to the Pacific basin, eroding the
mineral deposits along the slope of the Western Cordillera on their way. On the other hand, gold
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deposits around the Cauca and Magdalena rivers are more varied in nature, with vein as well as
placer mines. The northern highlands of the Central Cordillera (in what is today northern Antioquia),
for example, were rich in vein deposits such as those in the Buriticá mines, while the rivers flowing
east down the slopes of the Central Cordillera around the Ibagué and Mariquita region gave rise to
several placer deposits. Finally, it is worth mentioning that although these three regions contained
the majority of gold deposits in New Grenada, there were some other localized gold mining areas, for
example around the Suratá River region in current Santander, on the slopes of the Eastern Cordillera.
Although the three main gold-mining regions had been identified by the Spanish by the late 16th
Century, there was variation in the timing of exploitation of the different locations, both between and
within the broadly defined regions. While in some areas gold production declined during the first half
of the 17th Century, other mining districts like those in the Chocó along the Pacific lowlands only saw
their systematic developmnent in the 18th Century. In fact, two elements explain the spatial dynamics
of gold mining in New Grenada during the colonial period. First, the boom-and-bust nature of gold
mining. As mines were discovered, they were intensely exploited and rapidly depleted. Technological
limitations seem to have played an important role in this respect. For example, talking about the
Anserma mines near the Cauca River, West (1952) argues that
“Because of the pronounced Pyritic character of the ore, at least half of the gold content was
lost in washing. Consequently, many of the smaller mines closed down; by 1627 the Negro
slaves in the Anserma area had decreased to less than half of their former number. Yet,
during the period 1629-35 nearly 190,000 pesos of gold, most of which came from the vein
workings of Anserma, was registered at the royal treasury in Cartago. Although with their
output reduced, the vein mines continued to produce until the middle of the seventeenth
century...” (p. 10)
Indeed, most of the largest gold mines in Antioquia also saw their best years in the late 16th and
early 17th centuries. By this time, most of the mines had already been depleted. In 1663 an official
survey of Antioquia stated that only a few mines were not yet depleted by that time (Cardona (1942)).
Nevertheless, as some mines were depleted, others were discovered. For example, the exploitation of
the highland placers around Santa Rosa de Osos in the heart of Antioquia started only around the
mid 17th century. Gold mining in the Upper Magdalena region was particularly prone to boom and
bust behavior. The discovery of the gold placers in Remedios in 1594, for example, led to a huge gold
rush that brought Spaniards from regions as far away as Cartagena on the Caribbean coast. Slave
gangs were also relocated from other gold mines to Remedios during this gold rush. According to
West (1952), more than 2,000 slaves were brought during the first two years. The same pattern was
observed further south in the highlands of current Cauca:
“Throughout the colonial period the old gravels and recent stream alluvium of the Popayan
plateau yielded a steady but decreasing flow of gold. Today the bare red slopes of the
gravel hills and the almost endless rock and boulder tailings in the narrow valleys [at the]
back of Santander [de Quilichao] and Caloto attest to the thorough exploitation that this
area has undergone.” (West (1952), p.13)
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Occasionally, towns settled around the depleted mines would be moved towards newly discovered gold
deposits. This phenomenon was very recurrent in the Cauca drainage of the Antioquia province, and
probably led to very weak incentives for the development of public goods and local infrastructure.
According to West (1952), in the mining region of Cáceres
“Around 1700 depletion of surrounding placer deposits probably caused the transfer of
Caceres thirty miles downstream to its present site on the Cauca... At that point gold-
bearing terraces bordered the river, the old workings of which can still be seen today. By
the end of the eighteenth century, however, even the new site had been almost abandoned.
Today the town is still in a miserable state.” (p. 25)
The second element explaining the difference in the timing of exploitation of gold deposits in New
Grenada was the active opposition of native communities in some areas. This proved to be a major
constraint during the early decades of conquest, when Spanish authority was still very weak beyond
the main urban centers. It is best exemplified by the Spanish experience in the Nóvita area of the
Chocó lowlands. Although by the late 16th Century Spanish mining entrepreneurs had already located
and attempted to exploit the placer deposits along the Tamaná river using the local indigenous labor,
the native indigenous groups in the area rebelled in the late 1500s forcing the closure of all mining
activity. Spaniards were only able to return to the area in the 1630s and large scale exploitation in
the Chocó region only started in the late 17th Century. As a result, Chocó became the main gold
producing region in New Grenada only in the 18th Century. The resistance of the native communities
was also a huge impediment for exploitation of the San Sebastián area in the upper Magdalena River
in current Huila (in the highlands around the city of Popayán in current Cauca), and in the Frontino
mines of western Antioquia where, according to West (1952),
“Raids by hostile Chocoes probably caused temporary abandonment of the mines in the
closing years of the 16th century, but in 1610 miners from Santa Fé de Antioquia re-
established exploitation of the rich placers in the area.” (p. 23)
2.2 Slavery and Gold Mining
Not only was the active resistance of native communities a major obstacle to the Spanish exploita-
tion of gold mines, but it was also one of the main reasons why African slaves were introduced into
New Grenada. The distribution of gold deposits in fact appears to be correlated with the presence of
indigenous communities, which suffered an acute demographic collapse because of disease and overex-
ploitation in the mines. The difficulty in controlling the indigenous labor force, together with their
demise, led to a rapid substitution towards African slave labor. A case in point is the upper Cauca
River region, where
“By 1544 mining was well established in the upper Cauca... At the time, owing to indian
rebellions, the Spaniards were already bringing Negro slaves as mine laborers.” (West
(1952), p. 11)
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This situation was very similar to the Brazilian plantation experience, where indigenous labor was first
used and given up as mortality and reistance made it very expensive relative to slave labor (Schwartz
(1985)). On the other hand, it contrasts sharply with the mining experiences of Peru and Mexico,
where indigenous population densities in relative proximity to the silver deposits were much higher,
and easier to control. As a result, most of the labor supply in those silver mines was indigenous. A
third factor contributing to the substitution of African slaves for indigenous people was that colonial
legislation became much more protective of the indigenous peoples, partly as a response to their
demographic collapse. The legal differences in rights between both groups were marked, so that labor
coercion on African slaves became less expensive for mining entrepreneurs (Jaramillo (1974)). Slaves
often responded to coercion by fleeing the mines and Spanish settlements, retreating to inaccessible
locations. Several towns of fled slaves developed around the areas with largest slave populations, of
which the town of San Basilio de Palenque on the Caribbean coast is the best known. These towns
were effectively not under the control of the Spanish crown and remained so even after independence.
Of course, this was a major concern both for mining entrepreneurs and the authorities, and partly
explains the harsh nature of the legislation concerning slaves that fled from their owners (Jaramillo
(1974), de Friedman and Cross (1979)).
The Spanish Empire not only tried to control slave labor in New Grenada, but also held a tight control
over the slave trade, which increased the cost of slaves for mining entrepreneurs. For example, all slaves
imported to New Grenada had to enter through the port of Cartagena. Nevertheless, the incentives
for the use of slave labor in the mines were so large, that smuggling of African slaves became a major
concern for the authorities, to the extent that the crown forbid all trade through the Atrato River in
the Chocó region2. This river flows north along the Pacific lowlands, but actually ends its course in
the Caribbean Sea, which made it a very convenient route for the introduction of smuggled slaves into
the Pacific region. Nevertheless, even in the early period of mining activity the importation of slaves
was steady. Original documents in Colombia’s National Archives report figures from 1,000 to 2,400
slaves being imported annually through Cartagena during the 1590s (West (1952)). Of course, the
current ethnic distribution of the population in Colombia is highly correlated with the distribution of
gold mines during colonial times.
Together with the availability of indigenous labor, the location of gold mines was an important element
driving the early distribution of Spanish settlement in New Grenada, and hence, the distribution of
colonial State activity (McFarlane (1993)). Interestingly, in terms of our empirical strategy, the colonial
state centralized its presence in relatively large Spanish settlements around the gold mining regions,
which were intended to provide services and control to neighboring areas. These administrative and
supply centers often contained smelter and royal treasury offices, and had political and religious juris-
diction over the surrounding areas. Their typical bureaucracies included an alcalde de minas (mines
mayor) in charge of enforcing mining ordinances in surrounding camps, approving and recording the
registration of new claims, and judging legal cases arising from disputes between miners, a corregidor
de indios (sheriff for indian affairs) in charge of enforcing labor laws concerning the indigenous peo-
ple, and often a procurador general (general prosecutor) who would be in charge of enforcing tax and
commerce laws (West (1952), p. 107). So for example, Santa Fé de Antioquia, Cali and Popayán, all
2In Spanish, the name Atrato actually means ¨no trade¨.
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along the Cauca river, became administrative centers for their respective surrounding mining regions.
3 The Data
3.1 Slavery
Our focus of interest is the long-run effect of slavery on contemporary development outcomes. As
described above, we explore this relationship by comparing neighboring municipalities in gold-deposit
regions which differed in their status as gold mining places during the colonial period. Thus, we
first collected historical data on the incidence of slavery. Census data during colonial times in New
Grenada exists for 1778, but unfortunately the available data is reported only aggregated at the
province level3. Nevertheless, slavery was not abolished until 1851, quite a bit after New Grenada
achieved independence in 18194. In 1843 the republican government performed a census, in which
the number of slaves at the municipality level was reported (del Interior (1843)). As a measure of
slavery intensity, we focus on two measures; a dummy variable indicating the presence of slaves in a
given municipality in 1843, and the percentage of the population who were slaves in 1843. Table 1a
presents basic descriptive statistics splitting the sample between the colonial-gold-mine municipalities,
their non colonial-gold-mine neighbors, and all other Colombian municipalities. Of course, a natural
question that arises is the extent to which the 1843 distribution of slaves is a good proxy for the
late colonial period distribution of slaves. The historical account does not mention any important
differential trends in manumission or migration of slaves during this period. Nevertheless, we looked
directly at the province-level correlation between the proportion of slaves in the 1778 and the 1843
census, and it exceeds 0.8. Figure 3 illustrates the geographic distribution of slavery in New Grenada,
where darker colors imply a larger share of slaves in the population in 1843. As Table 1a shows, by
1843 gold mining municipalities had on average a 4% slave population, twice the fraction of non-gold-
mine municipalities. The table also reveals that slavery as a share of total population in the rest of
the country was almost an order of magnitude smaller. Although the fraction of remaining slaves by
1843 was low relative to the 1778 census, Figure 3 reveals that geographic variation was significant.
Moreover, it was highly correlated with the 1778 distribution. Similarly, gold-mining municipalities
were 1.5 times more likely to have slaves by 1843 than their neighboring municipalities without colonial
gold mines5.
As mentioned above, we focus on gold mining as our key source of identification, and obtained the
information on the location of colonial gold mines from Colmenares (1973), who in turn relied on West
(1952) and original historical sources. A total of 42 current municipalities are listed as having gold
mines at some point during the colonial period. We then included all the neighboring municipalities
3Provinces were sub-units within gobernaciones (the analogous to current departments). See Tovar et al. (1994).
4The abolition of slavery was accomplished gradually due to the political clout and opposition of slave-owners. In
1821 a Ley de Vientres (wombs law) was approved by the Cúcuta Congress, by which the newborn children of slaves
would be free when they turned 18. After abolition, the State actually made a commitment to compensate slave-owners
for their losses.
569% of gold-mining municipalities had slaves in 1843, while 45% of their non-gold-mining neighbors reported slaves
in the 1843 census.
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to this palette of 42 gold-mining municipalities, making up our base sample of 202 municipalities
(consisting of 42 neighborhoods and 206 pairs of municipalities; See Figure 4).
3.2 Main Outcomes
We collected data on several development outcomes. We obtain the poverty rate in 1993 an 2005
(percent of housholds classified as poor) from the Colombian Statistics Department DANE, and the
secondary school enrollment rate averaged over the 1992-2002 period from CEDE6. Some basic differ-
ences can already be seen from Table 1a, in the comparison of means between gold mining and non
gold mining neighbors. Gold-mining municipalities have almost 15 percentage points higher poverty
rates and 10 percentage points lower secondary school enrollment rates. On the other hand, the neigh-
boring municipalities look very similar to the rest of the country, both in the poverty rates and the
school enrollment rates. The same is true when looking at child vaccination rates for 2002 from the
OCCHA research group at the United Nations. These are 30 percentage points lower in gold-mining
municipalities than in their neighbors, which, in turn, are very similar to the rest of the country. Also
from OCCHA we have the percent of households with aqueduct, sewage and electricity coverage in
2002. Although no statistically significant differences can be observed for sewage converage between
gold-mining municipalities and their neighbors, the latter have around 20 percentage points higher
aqueduct and electricity coverage than the former. The final contemporary development outcome we
report in Table 1a is land inequality, as measured by the land gini coefficient in 2002. These land gini
coefficients are constructed using the cadastral data from IGAC, the Colombian geographic informa-
tion department. Land inequality is extremely high in Colombia, with an average land gini coefficient
of 0.70. The raw descriptive statistics do not reveal significant differences in this variable across the
different groups of municipalities.
Providing satisfactory evidence consistent with the idea that differences in the economic performace of
different municipalities are partly due to the historical incidence of slavery requires finding persistent
effects over long periods of time. With this purpose in mind, we collected information on intermediate
development outcomes by looking at the 1918 and the 1938 National Censuses. Both provide cross-
sectional historical data on several development outcomes. From the 1918 Census we have data on
total literacy, school enrollment, and vaccination coverage. From the 1938 Census we have data on
adult literacy, and on aqueduct, electricity, and sewage coverage of buildings7. Descriptive statistics are
reported in Table 1b . A pattern very similar to the one for contemporary outcomes can be observed,
although the magnitude of the differences is not as large as for current outcomes. Gold-mining munic-
ipalities have lower school enrollment rates in 1918, and significantly lower adult literacy, aqueduct,
electricity, and sewage coverage in 1938, than their neighbors. Once again, all other municipalities look
on average very similar to the neighbors sample. For example, electricity coverage in 1938 (percent of
buildings with electricity connection) was 2% for the colonial-gold-mining municipalities, 6% for their
neighbors, and 7% for all other municipalities.
6CEDE (Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Economico), is an economics research center at Universidad de los
Andes in Bogotá, Colombia.
7Notice that the contemporary data on aqueduct, electricity and sewage coverage is for households, whereas the 1938
data is for buildings.
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3.3 Other Municipality Characteristics
CEDE also provided us with a set of geographic covariates including longitude, latitude, land area,
altitude above sea level, average annual rainfall, distance to the department capital, and the density
of primary, secondary, and tertiary rivers8. Table 1a presents descriptive statistics for this data.
The table highlights that geographic characteristics in Colombia vary considerably across even short
distances. Because of the highly variable topographic conditions of the Andean region in Colombia,
some significant differences arise between municipalities with colonial gold mines and their neighbors.
The former have on average twice the land area, two thirds of the altitude, and 40% more rainfall
than the latter. These facts highlight that controlling for observable geographic characteristics in our
analysis is important, even when comparing municipalities which share a boundary. On the other
hand, both subsets of municipalities do not seem to differ in terms of their distance to main cities,
their river density, or their supply of agriculture-suitable land. We also collected data from IGAC on
the distribution of soil qualities, soil suitabilities (agriculture, livestock, conservation)9, and geological
features such as the share of fresh water, valleys, mountainous terrain, hilly terrain, and plains as a
fraction of total land area.
We also gathered some additional historical data. In particular, Durán y Díaz (1794) provides data
on state presence during the late colonial period. This is an original document containing detailed
information on the location of colonial state offices and the bureaucracy throughout New Granada
in 1794. Based on this source we computed two measures of colonial State presence. Durán y Díaz
(1794) reports the municipalities with a tobacco and playing cards estanco, an aguardiente (liquor) and
gunpoweder estanco, an alcabala, and a post office10. We constructed a “colonial state presence index”
taking values from 0 to 4, based on a straightforward count of how many of these local institutions
were present in the municipality, which constitutes our first measure of colonial State presence. Durán
y Díaz (1794) also reported the number of Crown employees in the municipality, and this constitutes
our second measure of colonial State presence. While municipalities with colonial gold mines appear
to have significantly larger values of the colonial state presence index than municipalities without gold
mines (1.26 vs. 0.5), the latter had larger numbers of Crown employees (3.54 vs. 2.17). The state
presence index is also correlated with the presence of slaves in 1843 for reasons already discussed above.
We also collected demographic data such as total population, and its self-reported ethnic composition in
2005 from DANE. In Colombia, people can report to be of African descent, indigenous, mixed, raizal11,
Roma, or not to report an ethnicity. The central feature to highlight is that gold-mining municipalities
have on average almost twice the share of population of African descent than their neighbors, which in
turn have three times the share of all other municipalities. Interestingly, the former also had twice as
many slaves in 1843 than the latter. Population of African descent make up 34% of the population in
8Longitude, latitude and altitude above sea level are computed for the cabecera municipal, this is, the location of the
urban center of the municipality.
9Notice this is data on geological classification of soils for their suitability for different activities, not on the actual
use of those soils.
10An estanco was a regional board with monopsonic and/or monopolic power over specific goods produced and traded
in the region. Thus for example, the liquor estanco would buy all of the local production of anise, necesary for the
production of aguardiente. An alcabala, on the other hand, was the tax-collection office in charge of collecting the
indirect taxes levied on consumption goods.
11Raizal refers to the ethnic population from the Caribbean islands of San Andrés and Providencia.
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gold-mining municipalities, they represent 18% of the population of neighbor municipalities, and only
6% of the population of all other municipalities. It is clear that the distribution of African descendants
is highly correlated with the places where slavery was most intensively used. One additional covariate
we collected is the incidence of Malaria in 2000-2003 (number of cases per 1000, averaged over the
4 years). Malaria incidence is almost 4 times higher in gold-mining municipalities compared to the
national average, because these receive higher rainfall, and are warmer (lower altitude) as the table
also shows. Nevertheless, gold-mining municipalities are again similar to their neighbors, with no
significant difference in this outcome either.
In an attempt to explore potential channels of persistence, we also collected information on contem-
porary state presence and the sectoral distribution of employment. Fundación Social, a Colombian
NGO, collected detailed data on an array of state presence variables in 1995. These include the num-
ber of municipality public employees, police posts, courts, registry offices, public phone service offices,
public mail service offices, health centers and hospitals, schools, libraries, fire stations, jails, and tax
collection offices. This data draws a very comprehensive picture of the distribution of state presence in
the mid 1990s. Additionally, OCCHA also provides data on per capita tax revenue, which is standard
in the state capacity literature as a measure of the taxing ability of the state.Table 1b also includes
descriptive statistics for the subset of state capacity outcomes which we discuss in the paper. Interest-
ingly, both for the gold-mining sample and for the neighbors sample, average tax collection, number
of per capita employees and number of per capita police posts are somewhat lower than for the rest
of the country. This is consistent with the conventional wisdom that gold-deposit areas have had a
historically low degree of state presence in Colombia. On the other hand, no significant differences
arise between the gold-mining sample and the neighbors sample for these variables.
4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 General Approach
A simple correlation between the fraction of slaves in 1843 and current income per capita (2001) across
Colombian departments reveals a strong negative relationship (See the top panel of Figure 1). In fact,
the poorest department of Colombia, Chocó, has an income per capita of around a fifth of the richest,
Bogotá, and had an order of magnitude more slaves as a share of the population in 1843. Although
suggestive, this correlation could be the result of many other factors explaining both the variation
in contemporary development outcomes and in the historical incidence of slavery. Indeed, differences
across departments are stark along many dimensions. A similar picture arises when looking at the
poverty rate in the cross-section of municipalities we use in this paper, which is negatively correlated
with the proportion of slaves in 1843 (See the bottom panel of Figure 1). In the cross section of
municipalities slavery is likely to be related with other determinants of long run development (even after
controlling for all posible observables). This will be in part because factor endowments, agricultural
productivity or distance to markets, among other things, are all likely to be correlated with colonial
slavery and could have an impact on the path of development. Although we might be able to control
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for some of these covariates, remaining unobservables could always be driving the correlations in the
data.
In the case of New Grenada, and more generally across the Spanish colonies in America, slavery was
used in large-scale agriculture, mining, haciendas, and domestic activities. Geography and natural
resources vary considerably even within Colombia, so that regions with different conditions exploited
slave labor for different activities and to a different extent. Throughout the historical discussion in
section 2, we stressed the importance of the gold mining economy as a key source of variation in slavery
in New Grenada. This is an attractive source of variation in slavery relative to, say, agricultural
productivity in cotton and sugarcane, or proximity to the slave auction markets in the Caribbean,
because most colonial gold mines in New Grenada were depleted at some point between the 16th
and early 19th centuries. Because other determinants of slavery such as agricultural productivity or
relative distance to markets are persistent features throughout long time periods, they are likely to
have direct effects on the outcomes of interest. In contrast, gold deposits exploited and depleted during
the colonial period, necessarily, cannot have a direct effect on current outcomes.
Nevertheless, the discussion also noted that gold-deposit regions are vastly different from non-gold-
deposit regions in many dimensions, and had very different historical experiences during the colonial
period. Hence, it is likely that gold deposit-location is correlated with determinants of current outcomes
for which we cannot control. In particular, a valid exogenous source of variation should have an effect
on current outcomes only through its effect on slavery intensity. Our argument is that gold mines are
a more attractive source of variation when the sample is restricted to gold-mining municipalities and
their neighbors because this avoids the comparison between gold-deposit regions and the rest of the
country.
Figure 4 presents a map of Colombia (excluding the eastern plains and the Amazon region, which were
frontier areas during colonial times) depicting the sample used in this paper, consisting of gold-mining
municipalities, shown in dark, and their direct neighbors, shown in a lighter shade. Differences in gold
mining status between neighboring municipalities are not likely to be correlated with differences in
other determinants of long-run outcomes. The neighborhood structure illustrated in Figure 4 makes it
clear that the validity of our identification strategy requires only that within each neighborhood, the
fact that one of the municipalities had colonial gold mines and its neighbors did not, can be considered
as good as randomly assigned (conditional on observables). If so, because these colonial mines were
depleted long ago, any differences in outcomes between pairs of neighboring municipalities can be
plausibly attributed to the difference in the incidence of slavery between them.
A caveat to this strategy is the possibility that colonial gold mines had an effect on slavery intensity
beyond the municipality boundaries, and into the surrounding neighborhood. Nevertheless, in this
setting the possibility of this spillover would have the effect of weakening the correlation between
the presence of colonial gold mines and slavery intensity in the sample, making colonial gold mines a
weak source of variation in observed slavery. Another concern is our choice of unit of analysis. By
comparing differences in slavery and outcomes across (neighboring) municipalities, we are focusing on
long-run effects of slavery working at the municipality level. If, in contrast, the mechanisms operate
at a larger level of aggregation (e.g. regional, provincial), so that in practice the effect of slavery spills
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across all municipalities within a given area, we would underestimate the effects of slavery on economic
development.
Out of a total of 1,119 Colombian municipalities, our sample is thus restricted to the 42 municipalities
which had colonial gold mines according to historical sources, and the 160 municipalities without gold
mines adjacent to them. Our first strategy, the neighbor-pair fixed effects estimator, is in the spirit of
a paired matching estimator, and compares each gold-mining municipality to each of its neighbors.
Cultural traits, some geographic features, or even violence (an important element in the Colombian
context) are all likely to be similar across the boundaries of neighboring municipalities. Neighboring
municipalities might even have common labor markets. Key to this empirical strategy is our ability
to directly control for all of the factors common to a given pair of neighbors, which we do by directly
introducing fixed effects for each neighbor pair. Although our strategy compares pairs of directly
adjacent municipalities, being able to control for unobservables shared by the pair is important. An
analogy with the randomized control trials literature is helpful to understand why. When the trials
sample is stratified, and the randomization of the treatment intent is performed at the subgroup level,
fixed effects for the subgroups on which the stratification has taken place should be included. To
the extent that the randomization differs, or take-up rates differ across the sub-groups, controlling
for this common unobservable within subgroups is necessary. In our setting, each pair of neighbors
is analogous to a subgroup, with the difference that we created the groups a fortiori, relying on the
assumption that each pair of neighbors was subject to the same regional environment. The reason
why one of them ended up with a gold mine in colonial times, and the other one did not, conditional
on observables, can be for all practical purposes considered as random. Within the neighbor-pair,
we argue that the conditionally exogenous source of variation in slavery is the presence of a colonial
gold mine. But gold-mining status for each current municipality is the realization of a stochastic
process that depended on municipality characteristics, idiosyncracies of the gold search process during
colonial times, and possibly some of the unobservables common to the neighbor pair. Hence, just as
in a randomized trials setting one needs to control for unobservable differences in the randomization
process across subgroups, here we need to control for analogous differences across pairs of neighbors.
In this setting, the inclusion of pair-specific fixed effects limits our ability to estimate standard errors
clustered at the neighborhood level because this would require a large number of observations per
cluster, while we only have two (Baum et al. (2003, p. 10)). In fact, we have 4 times as many pair
fixed effects as clusters, impeding the computation of such clustered standard errors.
To overcome this difficulty, we take advantage of the fact that we can model the variance structure
of unobservables following our construction of the estimation sample. This allows us to estimate
random effects models where we allow for within-cluster unobservables, and which, moreover, also
allows us to incorporate the specific sources of cross-neighborhood correlation that arise when a given
municipality is a member of more than one neighborhood. Reasuringly, the IV estimates from models
with neighbor-pair effects and with random effects are very similar.
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4.2 Estimation Framework
From the sample of all municipalities in Colombia, C, we restrict our analysis to the subset M ⊂ C
of municipalities which, according to the historical record, had gold mines at some point during the
colonial period, and the subset N of all their directly adjacent neighbors. Let K = M ∪N . We index
colonial gold mine municipalities by g, g = 1, .., 42, and non-colonial gold mine municipalities by i, j, k...
Also, define N(g) ⊆ N to be the subset of non-gold-mining neighbors of gold-mining municipality
g ∈ M . In the same way, define M(i) ⊆ M to be the subset of gold-mining municipalities of which
non-gold-mining municipality i ∈ N is a neighbor. Although for most non-gold-mining municipalities
M(i) is a singleton (i only belongs to one neighborhood), there are 38 non-gold-mining municipalities
bordering more than one gold mining municipality, and hence, for which M(i) has more than one
element.
Also, let yτ be any of our development outcomes, Sτ be our mesure of slavery, Gτ be an indicator
variable for the presence of colonial gold mines (so that Gg = 1 and Gi = 0), and let xτ be a vector of
covariates. xτ will include a constant, geographic variables, and department dummies unless otherwise
stated12.
4.2.1 Neighbor-pair fixed effects
Our first empirical strategy is based on comparing pairs of adjacent municipalities of which one member
had colonial gold mines and the other member did not. We posit the following linear model for
outcomes: For each pair (g, i), i ∈ N(g),
yg = βSg + γx′g + ξgi + νg g ∈M
yi = βSi + γxi′ + ξgi + νi i ∈ N(g)
(1)
where ξgi are the neighbor-pair fixed effects, which represent unobservables common for the neighbor
pair (g, i). ντ are τ -specific unobservables. Of course, we allow for cov(S, ξ) 6= 0. Under the assumption
that all remaining unobservables are conditionally uncorrelated with slavery, so that cov(S, ν) = 0, the
inclusion of neighbor-pair fixed effects is necessary for consistent estimation of β, our causal parameter
of interest. We estimate by OLS models of this form, and call the estimated effect βPEOLS the OLS
neighbor-pair fixed-effects estimator.
Even after controlling for common unobservables across municipality borders, and a flexible specifi-
cation for the geographic controls (we allow for up to a quartic polynomial on our geographic covari-
ates13), it is possible that cov(S, v) 6= 0. Hence, when allowing slavery to be conditionally correlated
with municipality-specific unobservables, to proceed further our identification strategy relies on the
12Although limited in number, some neighborhoods straddle department boundaries. Hence, there is some variation
in department status within neighborhoods and pairs.
13Indeed, given the discontinuous nature of the source of identification we are using (a boundary where colonial-gold-
mine status changes), controlling for a flexible specification on covariates is very important. If they induce any strong
nonlinearities on the outcomes, failing to take them into account might lead us to mistake these effects for the effect
of the difference in slavery intensity (Angrist and Pischke (2009)). This is in the same spirit of regression discontinuity
models, which generally control flexibly for other covariates around the discontinuity.
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assumption that conditional on the common unobservables for a pair of neighboring municipalities,
the difference in slavery between them is due to the presence of a colonial gold mine in one of them.
Moreover, it assumes that conditional on covariates and on the common-to-the-neighbor-pair fixed
effects, the presence of a gold mine at some point during colonial times does not have a direct effect
on current outcomes. Of course, the assumption that differences in slavery due only to the presence
or absence of a colonial gold mine are uncorrelated with municipality-specific unobservables is a sat-
isfactory assumption only when doing these very local contrasts. Moreover, the assumption that the
location of these colonial gold mines is as good as random is also only sensible when comparing nearby
areas within gold deposit regions.
Another key choice is whether we should focus on the intensive or the extensive margin of slavery.
We focus on the extensive margin for two reasons. First, this is likely to better capture the source of
variation relevant for long-run development, which depends not so much on the exact number of slaves
but whether a municipality developed economic and political institutions to use and control slaves.
The extensive margin is more relevant for the source of variation. The distribution of the proportion
of slaves supports our approach. Figure 5 shows a very skewed slavery intensity distribution in our
estimation sample, with most municipalities having either no slaves or a small fraction of them by
1843. Second, our data on slavery is from 1843, which is already late in the history of slavery in New
Grenada. At this point the gold mining economy had already been in decline for decades. In several
places it had all but dissapeared (Colmenares (1973)). Although the remnant slave distribution in 1843
is likely to be a proxy for the intensity of slavery during colonial times when the gold-mining economy
was thriving, we cannot account for any differential trends in the decline of slavery, for example due
to manumission14. We will also see that in OLS regressions, the extensive margin appears to be the
dimension correlated with long-run development outcomes.
Following this discussion, we also posit a first-stage relationship of the form
Sg = bGg + cx′g + ζgi + g g ∈M
Si = bGi + cx′i + ζgi + i i ∈ N(g)
(2)
where Sτ is a dummy for slavery, ζgi represents common unobservables for the neighbor pair (g, i), and
τ represents municipality-specific unobservables. Notice that the discrete nature of our instrument Gτ
implies that the Instrumental Variables estimator of β, which we call the IV neighbor-pair fixed-effects
estimator βPEIV , is equivalent to a Wald estimator. This equivalence makes the interpretation of the
source of identification very clear. β is identified off the average difference in outcomes between munic-
ipalities with colonial gold mines and municipalities without them (their neighbors), normalized by the
difference in slavery between both groups, conditional on covariates and neighbor-pair unobservables:
14One caveat is that as Kane et al. (1999) show in the context of the estimation of returns to schooling, when an
endogenous explanatory variable is a discrete proxy of a continuous variable, this introduces non-classical measurement
error which biases IV estimates even when the instrument is valid. As explained in the text, the slavery dummy is not a
proxy for slavery intensity but the relevant aspect of slavery. Nevertheless, if the intensive margin also matters, a similar
bias might still arise, though the OLS results below suggest that the intensive margin may not be very important in
practice.
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βIV = Wald =
E[y|G = 1,x, ξ]− E[y|G = 0,x, ξ]
E[S|G = 1,x, ζ]− E[S|G = 0,x, ζ]
4.2.2 Random effects
Our concern about correct inference leads us to our alternative estimation strategy. We posit a random
effects structure on the variance of unobservables in our sample. Specifically, we assume that there
is one unobservable ξ for each neighborhood, and that all of these are drawn independently from a
common distribution with zero-mean and variance σ2ξ . Thus, the random effects model is
yg = βSg + γx′g + ξg + νg g ∈M
yi = βSi + γx′i +
∑
g∈M(i) ξg + νi i ∈ N
(3)
The correlation structure is assumed to take the following form: E[ξ2g ] = σ2ξ , E[ξg1ξg2 ] = 0, E[ν
2] = σ2ν ,
E[ξν] = 0, and E[νiνj ] = 0. The analogous first stage of the Random Effects model takes the form
Sg = bGg + cx′g + ξg + g g ∈M
Si = bGi + cx′i +
∑
g∈M(i) ξg + i i ∈ N
(4)
where the correlation structure is the same as the one for the second stage. Defining ug = ξg + νg and
ui =
∑
g∈M(i) ξg + νi, the above implies that
E[u2g] = σ
2
ξ + σ
2
ν
E[ug1ug2 ] = 0
E[u2i ] = |M(i)|σ2ξ + σ2ν
E[ugui] =
σ2ξ if g ∈M(i)0 if g /∈M(i)
E[uiuj ] = |M(i) ∩M(j)|σ2ξ
Using these moments we construct the covariance matrix for the residuals Ω = E[uu′]. This corre-
lation structure takes into account both the within-clusters residual correlation, and the cross-cluster
correlation induced by the non-gold-mining municipalities in common across neighborhoods. Appendix
1 illustrates the structure of Ω with a simple example. Of course, the feasible random effects estima-
tor requires prior estimation of Ω. Using the standard OLS residuals from equation (3), Appendix 1
describes the construction of the estimated variance matrix Ωˆ15.
15For the IV models, either the standard OLS or the IV residuals can be used for consistent estimation of σˆ2ξ and σˆ
2
ν
(White (1989, p. 190)). Throughout we present results using OLS residuals.
17
We first estimate the model in equation(3), and call the estimated effect βREOLS the OLS random effects
estimator. As is standard in a GLS setting, defining X = [S : x], the OLS Random effects estimator
is given by
βREOLS = (X
′Ωˆ−1X)−1(X′Ωˆ−1y) (5)
Defining the matrix W as
W(i, j) =
uiuj if Ω(i, j) 6= 00 if Ω(i, j) = 0
the within-cluster heteroskedasticity-robust variance matrix of this estimator is given by
V
(
βREOLS
)
= (X′Ωˆ−1X)−1X′Ωˆ−1WΩˆ−1X)(X′Ωˆ−1X)−1 (6)
For the IV Random effects estimator βREIV , we follow White (1989), who discusses Instrumental Vari-
ables Generalized Least Squares estimators. Defining Z = [G : x], the IV Random effects estimator is
given by16
βREIV = (X
′Ωˆ−1Z(Z′Ωˆ−1Z)−1Z′Ωˆ−1X)−1(X′Ωˆ−1Z(Z′Ωˆ−1Z)−1Z′Ωˆ−1y) (7)
In analogous way as in equation (6), the within-cluster heteroskedasticity-robust variance matrix of
this estimator is given by
V
(
βREIV
)
= (X′Ωˆ−1Z(Z′Ωˆ−1Z)−1Z′Ωˆ−1X)−1(X′Ωˆ−1Z(Z′Ωˆ−1Z)−1Z′Ωˆ−1W
∗Ωˆ−1Z(Z′Ωˆ−1Z)−1Z′Ωˆ−1X(X′Ωˆ−1Z(Z′Ωˆ−1Z)−1Z′Ωˆ−1X)−1 (8)
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Similarity of Neighbors
Our strategy compares gold-mining with non-gold-mining municipalities. As such, it resembles match-
ing methodologies, which often are based on matching on observables, and similarly requires both
municipalities in a pair not to differ significantly on key observable characteristics. Thus, we begin
by presenting a set of “similarity” regressions in Table 2. The table reports the estimation results of
running OLS neighbor-pair fixed effects regressions of the different measures of soil qualities and soil
characteristics, on the colonial gold mine dummy Gτ :
16White (1989) notices that the standard IV analogue βˆ = (X′Z(Z′Z)−1Z′Ωˆ−1Z(Z′Z)−1Z′X)−1(X′Z(Z′Z)−1Z′Ωˆ−1y)
is not in general correct in the presence of heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation. This expression is also not an
efficient estimator in the presence of more than one instrument, when residuals are spherical (White (1989, p. 178)).
We nevertheless also computed this estimator, which yields results almost identical to those from equation (7) (omitted
to save space).
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Tg = φ+ piGg + δgi + g g ∈M
Ti = φ+ piGi + δmi + i i ∈ N(g)
(9)
In equation (9), Tτ can be any of the shares of soil qualities (classified from quality 1 to quality 8 by
IGAC), the shares of soil suitabilities, or the shares of land under different topological conditions. Table
2 shows that across all of these characteristics, no significant differences arise between the different
pairs of adjacent municipalities. The reported regressions in the table do not include department fixed
effects, but results including them make the estimates of pi even smaller and less significant. These
results make us confident we are comparing pairs of municipalities that are indeed very similar to each
other along key geographic features.
5.2 Development Outcomes
5.2.1 Current Outcomes: OLS results
We begin the exposition of our findings by focusing on four contemporary development outcomes.
Table 3 presents OLS results for the 1993 poverty rate, average secondary enrollment rates between
1992 and 2002, the fraction of children vaccinated in 2002, and the land gini coefficient in 2002. For
each outcome, the first four columns of the table present results for the neighbor-pair fixed effects
model in equation (1), while the fifth to eigth columns present analogous results for the random effects
model in equation (3). Odd-numbered columns present the estimates of a model focusing on the
extensive margin of slavery, so that the explanatory variable is a dummy taking the value of 1 for
those municipalities that had slaves in 1843. Even-numbered columns include a horse race between
the intensive and extensive margins, adding the fraction of slaves in 1843 on the right-hand side.
In line with the discussion above, Table 3 suggests that the extensive margin is much more important
as a correlate of contemporary development outcomes. In particular, the introduction of the fraction
of slaves (in the even-numbered columns) does not alter the magnitude or significance of the estimated
coefficient on the slavery dummy (in the odd-numbered columns). Indeed, the slavery dummy is
statistically significant throughout the table, except for the random effects estimates on the land gini
models, where the slavery dummy is not significant prior to the introduction of the proportion of
slaves variable. Moreover, the fraction of slaves is either statistically insignificant, or its significance
is lower than the significance level of the slavery dummy. The exception is column (10) looking at
secondary enrollment in the neighbor-pair fixed effects specification, where both the slave dummy and
the fraction of slaves are significant and the latter has a larger t-statistic. Nevertheless, the fraction of
slaves loses its significance in the random effects model. Of course, the fact that the fraction of slaves
remains significant in some specifications (particularly in the children vaccination rate models) does
not allow us to completely rule out the possibility that the intensive margin might play a role of its
own.
Focusing on column (1) in Table 3, municipalities with slaves in 1843 appear to have on average 15.9
(s.e.= 2.45) percentage points higher poverty rates that their neighbor pairs in 1993. The estimated
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magnitude falls only slightly to 12.1 (s.e.= 2.73) when including the battery of geographic controls
(see column (3)). This is around a quarter of the mean poverty rate, or two thirds the standard
deviation of the poverty rate across Colombian municipalities. The magnitude of the difference falls to
around a half in the random effects models. The estimate in column (7) implies that within a cluster
of municipalities around a colonial gold mine municipality, municipalities with slavery (in 1843) have
on average 5.7 (s.e.= 2.6) percentage points higher poverty rates than those without. This is in fact
a general pattern: in the OLS estimates, we typically see a fall of about 50% when moving from
the neighbor-pair fixed effects to the neighborhood random effects specifications. We do not have an
explanation for this pattern. But reassuringly, as we will see below, the estimated magnitudes in the
instrumental variables models, which are our main focus, are very similar between the neighbor-pair
fixed effects and the neighborhood random effects specifications.
Together with increased poverty rates, columns (11) and (15) show that the presence of slaves is
associated with between 10 (s.e.= 4.2) and 6.5 (s.e.= 3.3) percentage points lower secondary enrollment
rates (for the neighbor-pair fixed effects and neighborhood random effects, respectively). The latter
estimate imples an effect that is 10% of the average and 23% of the standard deviation in secondary
enrollment rates across Colombia. Across outcomes, children vaccination rates appear to be the most
strongly correlated with slavery. The random effects estimate in column (23) implies that municipalities
with slaves have 14.5 (s.e.= 3.6) percentage points lower vaccination coverage than their neighbors
without slaves. This is equivalent to 20% of the average, and almost half a standard deviation of the
Colombian distribution of vaccination rates. The fourth panel of Table 3 presents results for the land
gini coefficient. Although estimates are statistically significant and positive for all of the neighbor-
pair fixed effects models, they lose significance in the random effects specifications. Nevertheless,
the coefficient magnitudes remain fairly similar. The point estimate from column (31) implies 0.023
higher land gini indeces in municipalities with slavery relative to their neighboring non-slaveholding
municipalities17.
The top panel of Table A2.1 in Appendix 2 presents analogous OLS results for additional contempo-
rary development outcomes. Municipalities with slaves appear to have lower electricity and aqueduct
coverage rates in 2002, and somewhat higher poverty rates in 200518. The OLS estimates for both
neighbor-pair fixed effects and neighborhood random effects show a robust pattern of economic un-
derperformance of municipalities with slaves in 1843 relative to their adjacent neighbors without any
slaves. These results motivate our subsequent instrumental variables strategy.
5.2.2 First Stages
The estimates we have presented thus far assume that any differences in slavery status across munici-
pality boundaries is conditionally uncorrelated with unobservables that vary within the pairs of colonial
17Note, however, that we have no data on land ginis for municipalities in the northwestern department of Antio-
quia, which reduces our sample size for this outcome critically, given the historical importance of gold mining in this
department. This may partly explain the reduced significance in slavery here.
18We should point out that demographers have raised some concerns regarding the 2005 Population Census from which
the 2005 poverty data comes from. The apparent reason is a flawed sampling design. For this reason we focused on the
1993 poverty data.
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gold-mining/non-gold-mining municipalities, or within the neighborhoods of colonial gold-mining mu-
nicipalities. Despite our exclusive focus on a sample of municipalities lying in gold deposit regions, and
despite our local comparisons of pairs and adjacent neighborhoods, we can actually exploit variation
in colonial gold mining status directly as an instrument for slave presence in 1843. The relationship
between presence of colonial gold mines and presence of slaves is strong. In our estimation sample,
29 out of 42 municipalities with colonial gold mines had a positive number of slaves in 1843 (70%),
while only 73 out of 160 municipalities without colonial gold mines had slaves in 1843 (45%). Table
4 looks more rigurously at this relationship. It presents the first stages of our main instrumental
variables models, across different specifications, for the sample used in the 1993 poverty rate models19.
Columns (1) to (5) present the first-stage estimates for the neighbor-pair effects models, while columns
(6) to (10) look at the neighborhood random effects estimates. These first stages are fairly precisely
estimated, and the coefficient estimates are only marginally affected by the introduction of geographic
controls (columns (2) and (7)), a full quartic polynomial on the geographic controls (columns (3) and
(8)), and the number of Crown employees in 1794 as a mesure of colonial State presence (columns
(5) and (10)). The introduction of the colonial state presence index in 1794 in columns (4) and (8)
reduces the magnitude of the colonial gold mines dummy from around 0.37 (s.e.= 0.06) in column (6),
to 0.26 (s.e.= 0.08) in column (9), but the estimate remains highly significant. Overall, the first stage
results show that the presence of colonial gold mines within these gold deposit regions is associated
with a 30% higher likelihood of still having slaves in 1843. These results are very similar between the
neighbor-pair fixed effects and random effects models.
5.2.3 Current Outcomes: IV results
Table 5 then presents the main results of our paper. It reports the instrumental variables estimates
of the effect of slavery on our main set of contemporary development outcomes. The table reports
specifications without and with geographic controls, for both the neighbor-pair fixed effects and the
neighborhood random effects models. It also presents the F-statistic for joint significance of the associ-
ated first stage, showing it is always strong. Odd-numbered columns present the baseline specification,
and even-numbered columns then introduce geographic controls. Estimates for the slavery dummy are
fairly stable both to the inclusion of geographic controls, and across models. The magnitude of the
neighbor-pair fixed effects IV estimates is very close to that of the corresponding OLS estimate. Only
for the land gini models the IV estimates appear to be around 50% larger in magnitude. In line with
our concern regarding appropriate inference, the neighborhood random effect standard errors for the
IV estimates are consistenly larger than the corresponding neighbor-pair fixed effects standard errors.
Given the similar magnitudes of the estimates of both kinds of specifications, below we will focus on
describing the random effects results.
The estimate from column (4) in Table 5 implies that the presence of slavery in 1843 has led to
13.1 percentage points (s.e.= 6.9) higher poverty rates within neighborhoods of municipalities in gold
deposit regions around a colonial gold mining municipality. This estimate is statistically significant at
19Table A2.2 in Appendix 2 presents the benchmark first stages for all the different samples. They are all very close
to the ones discussed in this section.
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the 5% level. The point estimate for secondary enrollment rates from column (7) is −0.127 (s.e.= 0.06),
also significant at the 5% level. Nevertheless, the inclusion of geographic controls reduces its magnitude
to = 0.11 (s.e.= 0.06) making it marginally insignificant. Moving on to the children vaccination rate
in column (12), the estimate of −0.25 (s.e.= 0.1) implies that the presence of slavery has led to
25 percentage points lower vaccination rates, which is close to a full standard deviation decrease in
vaccination coverage. Lastly, column (16) reports the IV random effects estimate for the land gini.
In contrast to the OLS result, here the point estimate is significant at the 5% level. The presence of
slavery in 1843 is associated with 0.04 (s.e.= 0.02) points higher land inequality as measured by the
gini coefficient. This pattern of results for the land gini suggests that the OLS estimate is subject to
attenuation bias due to measurement error, not only because the IV estimate is larger in magnitude,
but also because the IV standard errors increases by less than the coefficient estimates, making the IV
estimates statistically more significant. For completeness, the top panel of Table A2.3 in Appendix 2
presents the IV estimates for our additional contemporary outcomes. Although the pattern of signs is
consistent with slavery having a negative effect on development, the random effects estimates remain
significant after the introduction of geographic controls only for aqueduct coverage (see column (6)).
5.2.4 Intermediate Outcomes
In the subsection above we have reported finding an effect of mid-19th century slavery on late 20th
century and early 21st century development outcomes. By themselves, those results are quite remark-
able. Nevertheless, it would be reasuring to observe similar patterns at intermediate dates. With
this purpose in mind, Table 6 presents OLS results for a subset of outcomes from the 1918 and the
1938 population censuses. The sample of municipalities available for these dates is smaller than the
one used for contemporary outcomes. Albeit weaker, we nevertheless find some suggestive results.
Table 6 presents results for the 1918 school enrollment rate and vaccination coverage in the top panel,
and for the 1938 literacy rate and aqueduct coverage in the bottom panel. Following the format of
previous tables, the first two columns for each outcome present neighbor-pair fixed effects estimates,
and the last two columns present neighborhood random effects estimates. Odd-numbered columns are
the benchmark specifications, and even-numbered columns include geographic controls. Table 6 shows
that the pattern of signs is robust. Slavery in 1843 is associated with lower school enrollment and
vaccination rates in 1918, and with lower literacy and aqueduct coverage rates in 1938. Neighbor-pair
fixed effects estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level for both of the 1938 outcomes (see
columns (10) and (14)), and for school enrollment in 1918 prior to the introduction of geographic con-
trols (see column (1)). Random effects estimates, although close in magnitude to neighbor-pair fixed
effects estimates, are in general statistically insignificant. An exception is the estimate for slavery
in the 1938 literacy rate model, which is significant at the 10% level (−0.03 with s.e.= 0.018). The
bottom panel of Table A2.1 in Appendix 2 presents complementary results looking at the literacy rate
in 1918, sewage, and electricity coverage rates in 1938.
Table 7 follows the same format, and presents instrumental variables estimates as those from Table
6. IV leads to statistically significant estimates for both of the 1938 outcomes. Once more, both IV
neighbor-pair fixed effects and neighborhood random effects estimates are similar in magnitude to OLS
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neighbor-pair estimates. The estimate from column (11) is −0.07 (s.e.= 0.03). It implies that slavery
in 1843 led to 7 percentage points lower literacy in 1938. At a time where only 46% of the population in
Colombia were literate, this is an effect of considerable economic importance. Similarly, the estimate
from column (16) is −0.024 (s.e.= 0.012), and implies that municipalities with slavery would have
about half the aqueduct coverage in 1938 of Colombian municipalities without slavery. IV estimates
for both 1918 outcomes, though consistently negative, are not statistically significant. Finally, the
bottom panel of Table A2.3 in Appendix 2 presents complementary IV results looking at the literacy
rate in 1918, and sewage and electricity coverage rates in 1938. Here, the random effects estimate for
the electricity coverage model is significant (−0.02, s.e.= 0.012), implying an electricity coverage by
1938 in municipalities with slavery almost 30% lower than in non-slaveholding municipalities.
Overall, our results for intermediate outcomes are less precisely estimated, possibly reflecting the
smaller sample size and the noisier data, and though consistently in the same direction as our contem-
porary outcome results, they are typically not statistically significant. This leaves the possibility that
the divergence occurred in part in the second half of the 20th century, though our interpretation puts
more weight on this being a consequence of smaller sample size and lower data quality.
5.3 Robustness
In this section we present additional robustness exercises. Table 9 and Table 10 present OLS and
IV estimates, respectively, of some additional specifications on our main contemporary development
outcomes. For each outcome the first three columns present results for neighbor-pair fixed effects
models, and the last three columns present neighborhood random effects models. For each class of
models, the first column presents results when allowing a fully flexible fourth-degree polynomial on
our geographic covariates. As we mentioned in section 4, the discontinuous nature of our identification
strategy makes it important that we make sure the effects are not being driven by sharp nonliearities at
the municipality boundaries. Reassuringly, although standard errors increase somewhat, the magnitude
of the estimates remains stable relative to the specifications without the polynomial terms.
As we discussed in section 2, natural resources and colonial state presence are likely correlated across
Colombia. There we argued that within a neighbor-pair of municipalities, or within a neighborhood
of adjancent municipalities, the presence or absence of gold mines during the colonial period was
uncorrelated with colonial state presence, which would vary significantly only at the regional level.
This is, of course, a key identifying assumption of our empirical strategy. On the other hand, although
our data on slavery is for 1843, as we mentioned above, we consider this to be a proxy for the presence
of this labor institution during the the 2.5 centuries of colonial rule. From this perspective, colonial
state presence in the late 18th century (for which we have municipality-level data in 1794), at the
eve of the emancipation from Spain, could be a potentially important omitted variable. Table 8
presents a table of correlations between our 1843 slavery dummy and our two measures of colonial
state presence in 1794, the colonial state presence index described in section 3, and the number of
Crown employees, in our estimation sample. The three variables are positively correlated, but the
correlation is stronger between the colonial state presence index and slavery (ρ = 0.4) than between
the number of Crown employees and slavery (ρ = 0.1). Hence, the second columns of Table 9 and Table
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10 subsequently include the colonial state presence index in 1794, and the third columns use Crown
employees alternatively. Focusing on Table 10, as a salient pattern, the magnitude of the estimate
for the slavery dummy increases in magnitude when the colonial state presence index is included.
For example, for the 1993 poverty rate, the random effects coefficient estimate in column (5) is 20.77
(s.e.= 10.55). Interestingly, our measures of colonial state presence appear to be positively correlated
with development (they enter negatively in the poverty rate and land gini models, and positively in the
secondary enrollment and vacciantion coverage models). This pattern suggests that our benchmark
estimates of the effect of slavery may actually be biased downwards due to a positive correlation
between slavery and state presence.
Estimates of the slavery dummy, on the other hand, remain almost unchanged when controlling for
Crown employees instead. This suggests that the presence of colonial taxation and public goods
institutions, as measured by the State presence index, is qualitatively different from the presence
of crown employees. Interestingly, a large fraction of the reported Crown employees were actually
members of the militia. Overall, Table 10 does not suggest our results are being driven either by non-
linearities on geographic observables, nor by a correlation of slavery with other historical institutions
such as the colonial state. If anything, the results suggest that our estimates are lower bounds on
the effect of slavery on long-run development. We must notice, nevertheless, that the random effects
estimates for the land gini do become insignificant after the introduction of the quartic polynomial in
geographic variables. This is a model with a significantly reduced number of degrees of freedom given
the smaller sample size for this outcome, and the increased number of covariates.
As an additional set of results, we explored some potential channels of persistence. We do not find
strong evidence suggesting their importance. Thus, we leave those results in Appendix 2. In particular,
following Michaels (2010), who finds patterns of sectoral specialization in a sample of Texan counties
as a result of oil discoveries, we explored the possibility that slaveholding municipalities may have
endured differential patterns of sectoral specialization. Table A2.4 presents neighbor-pair fixed effects
“similarity” regressions (see equation(9)) of the sectoral (formal) employment distribution in 200820, on
the colonial gold mines dummy. Gold mining municipalities do not appear to have a differential size of
the agriculture, the mining, the manufacturing or the government employment shares relative to their
neighbors without gold mines. Table A2.5 then looks at neighbor-pair fixed effects regressions of the
same four employment shares on the slavery dummy, also without any discernible differences between
neighboring municipalities with and without slaves. These results suggest that sectoral specialization
has not been a channel through which the negative effects of slavery have persisted over time.
Finally, Table A2.6 explores differences in contemporary state presence, once again looking at neighbor-
pair fixed effect models. We looked at a large array of variables, but the table only presents the
estimation results for the per capita tax revenue in 2002, for the per capita number of municipality
public employees in 1995, and for the per capita number of police posts in 1995. The estimate for
slavery is negative and significant for the police posts models (see columns (7)-(9)), but it is not for any
20Formal employment is defined as the number of workers who are covered by either health, pension, or health and
pension benefits. This data accounts only for fomal employment, which is only around 45% of total employment in
Colombia. Unfortunately there is no available information on total (formal and informal) employment at the sectoral-
municipality level. Albeit imperfect, the data does give a picture of the sectoral distribution of employment. In particular,
we use the share of (formal) employment in agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and government services.
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alternative state presence outcome we looked at. On the basis of these results, our interpretation is that
contemporary state presence , though important as a determinant of development in the Colombian
context, is not one of the main channels of persistent effects of slavery.
6 Conclusions
Slavery has been a major institution of labor coercion throughout history. It was widely used across the
Americas during the colonial period, and the institution remained in place well into the 19th century.
Despite the large historical literature on the causes and consequences of slavery, little research has been
focused on establishing a causal link between the incidence of this extractive institution and long-run
development. In this paper we undertake this task by looking at the historical experience of Colombia.
One major source of demand for slave labor in Colombia during the period under Spanish colonial
rule was the gold mining economy. These gold mines, nevertheless, were subject to boom and bust
cycles and were rapidly depleted. More importantly, within narrowly defined gold-deposit regions, the
discovery of gold mines at some point during the colonial period was to a large extent idiosyncratic.
Thus, we exploit variation in colonial gold mining status across pairs of direcly adjacent municipalities,
and within clusters of neighboring municipalities to identify the effect of slavery on economic perfor-
mance. We argue that our strategy successfully allows us to separately identify the effect of slavery
from other possible confounds. Factors such as the historical presence of the state or unobservables
such as cultural differences are likely very similar within these narrowly defined gold-deposit regions.
Our estimates indicate that the presence of slavery has led to increased poverty, lower public good
provision and higher land inequality today. The finding of systematic differences across a wide set of
development outcomes makes us confident about our findings. Moreover, by looking at similar devel-
opment outcomes in the early 20th century, we also find evidence that these effects have been present
for at least the last 100 years. The effects, nevertheless, appear to be stronger in more recent times.
Understanding the channels of persistence of coercive institutions such as slavery is the most important
next step. In this work we were able to partially rule out some potential channels such as sectoral com-
position and contemporary presence of state institutions, though our understanding of these channels
of influence remains imperfect.
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Tables
Table 1a
Variable Obs Mean Std.	  Dev. Obs Mean Std.	  Dev. Obs Mean Std.	  Dev.
Had	  Slaves	  in	  1843 839 0.419 0.493 42 0.690 0.460 0.001 145 0.400 0.490
%	  Slaves	  in	  1843 839 0.006 0.018 42 0.04 0.06 0.001 145 0.02 0.04
Current	  Development	  Outcomes
	  	  	  	  	  Land	  Gini	  Index,	  2002 743 0.680 0.100 34 0.72 0.12 0.940 105 0.72 0.09
	  	  	  	  	  %	  in	  Poverty,	  2005 917 44.457 20.667 42 76.61 39.26 0.000 160 43.52 31.37
	  	  	  	  	  %	  in	  Poverty,	  1993 839 51.760 18.240 42 61.92 25.12 0.000 145 55.35 19.44
	  	  	  	  	  Secondary	  Enrollment	  Rate,	  1992-­‐2002 828 0.588 0.264 40 0.52 0.25 0.013 145 0.62 0.22
	  	  	  	  	  %	  Homes	  with	  Aqueduct,	  2002 895 67.425 24.086 42 49.40 30.35 0.000 156 72.10 20.17
	  	  	  	  	  %	  Homes	  with	  Sewage,	  2002 895 31.888 24.519 42 35.55 29.90 0.952 156 35.29 23.17
	  	  	  	  	  %	  Homes	  with	  Electricity,	  2002 895 70.678 22.583 42 57.99 28.97 0.000 156 77.13 19.66
	  	  	  	  	  %	  Children	  Vaccinated,	  2002 789 0.741 0.267 42 0.41 0.19 0.000 156 0.74 0.22
Geographic
	  	  	  	  	  Longitude 839 -­‐74.55 1.41 41 -­‐75.76 1.41 0.841 145 -­‐75.70 1.33
	  	  	  	  	  Latitude 839 5.75 2.50 41 5.47 1.94 0.223 145 5.05 2.10
	  	  	  	  	  Land	  Area	  (Sq.	  Kms) 839 613.1 1459.7 41 1575.6 1989.2 0.0001 145 738.3 774.5
	  	  	  	  	  Altitude	  Above	  Sea	  Level	  (mts.) 839 1235.5 920.9 41 790.5 779.0 0.015 145 1125.1 763.0
	  	  	  	  	  Annual	  Rainfall	  (millimeters) 839 1748.0 866.7 41 3273.3 2043.1 0.001 145 2357.7 1287.1
	  	  	  	  	  Distance	  to	  Department	  Capital	  (Kms.) 839 109.44 81.71 41 178.37 157.03 0.210 145 147.56 128.13
	  	  	  	  	  Density	  of	  Primary	  Rivers	  (Kms./Sq.	  Kms.) 839 33.52 251.30 41 20.52 68.53 0.648 145 32.22 160.21
	  	  	  	  	  Density	  of	  Secondary	  Rivers	  (Kms./Sq.	  Kms.) 839 23.51 60.17 41 51.91 133.59 0.050 145 27.21 34.83
	  	  	  	  	  Density	  of	  Tertiary	  Rivers	  (Kms./Sq.	  Kms) 839 18.29 57.60 41 27.77 81.02 0.218 145 17.55 30.18
	  	  	  	  	  Per	  Capita	  Land	  Suitable	  for	  Agriculture	  	  (Sq.	  Kms.) 825 0.62 2.10 41 0.37 0.89 0.822 145 0.44 1.61
Demographics
	  	  	  	  	  Population,	  2005 836 35872 209691 42 60193 101776 0.441 144 39648 161100
	  	  	  	  	  %	  Indigenous	  Population.	  2005 911 5.33 16.28 42 10.35 16.58 0.518 160 7.77 17.79
	  	  	  	  	  %	  Afro-­‐decending	  population,	  2005 911 5.99 14.71 42 33.92 34.19 0.003 160 18.48 28.51
	  	  	  	  	  %	  Other	  Ethnicities,	  2005 911 86.37 22.75 42 51.27 41.23 0.010 160 69.25 37.35
	  	  	  	  	  Malaria	  Incidence,	  2000-­‐2003 912 2.89 16.20 42 13.80 26.74 0.706 158 11.88 29.81
Colonial	  Gold	  Mines p-­‐value	  for	  t-­‐test	  
for	  equality	  of	  
means
Colonial	  Gold	  Mines	  NeighborsAll	  Municipalities
DESCRIPTIVE	  STATISTICS
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Table 1b
Variable Obs Mean Std.	  Dev. Obs Mean Std.	  Dev. Obs Mean Std.	  Dev.
Had	  Slaves	  in	  1843 839 0.419 0.493 42 0.690 0.460 0.001 145 0.400 0.490
%	  Slaves	  in	  1843 839 0.006 0.018 42 0.04 0.06 0.001 145 0.02 0.04
Historical	  Development	  Outcomes
	  	  	  	  	  Literacy	  Rate,	  1918 577 0.271 0.124 33 0.28 0.13 0.491 99 0.30 0.12
	  	  	  	  	  School	  Enrollment,	  1918 577 0.065 0.047 33 0.06 0.03 0.003 99 0.08 0.04
	  	  	  	  	  Vaccine	  Coverage,	  1918 577 0.299 0.204 33 0.27 0.13 0.634 99 0.29 0.16
	  	  	  	  	  Adult	  Literacy	  Rate,	  1938 640 0.463 0.164 33 0.35 0.13 0.000 118 0.453 0.13
	  	  	  	  	  %	  Buildings	  with	  Aqueduct,	  1938 641 0.048 0.093 33 0.02 0.02 0.000 118 0.051 0.03
	  	  	  	  	  %	  Buildings	  with	  Electricity,	  1938 641 0.071 0.111 33 0.02 0.03 0.000 118 0.060 0.03
	  	  	  	  	  %	  Buildings	  with	  Sewage,	  1938 641 0.023 0.058 33 0.005 0.01 0.001 118 0.017 0.02
Contemporary	  State	  Capacity
	  	  	  	  	  Per	  Capita	  Tax	  Collection,	  2002 895 29919 44364 42 27035 27054 0.258 156 22400 22451
	  	  	  	  	  Per	  Capita	  Municipality	  Public	  Employees,	  1995 837 2.116 1.848 42 1.95 1.68 0.795 144 2.03 2.00
	  	  	  	  	  Per	  1000	  Police	  Posts,	  1995 801 0.097 0.093 40 0.06 0.07 0.342 142 0.07 0.06
Economic	  Structure
	  	  	  	  	  Official	  Labor	  Share	  in	  Agriculture,	  2008 907 0.054 0.097 42 0.043 0.055 0.727 158 0.048 0.076
	  	  	  	  	  Official	  Labor	  Share	  in	  Mining,	  2008 907 0.153 0.164 42 0.190 0.221 0.028 158 0.130 0.136
	  	  	  	  	  Official	  Labor	  Share	  in	  Manufacturing,	  2008 907 0.166 0.195 42 0.113 0.144 0.140 158 0.159 0.187
	  	  	  	  	  Official	  Labor	  Share	  in	  Government	  Services,	  2008 907 0.117 0.158 42 0.078 0.080 0.117 158 0.124 0.184
Historical	  State	  Capacity
	  	  	  	  	  Count	  of	  Number	  of	  Colonial	  Offices	  in	  1794* 840 0.540 0.816 42 1.26 1.17 0.000 145 0.50 0.97
	  	  	  	  	  Number	  of	  Crown	  Employees	  in	  1794 840 6.192 134.95 42 2.17 2.65 0.714 145 3.54 24.27
*	  Colonial	  Public	  Offices	  include	  a	  State	  monopoly	  administration	  for	  Aguardiente	  and	  Gunpowder,	  a	  State	  monopoly	  administration	  for	  Tobbaco	  and	  Cards	  (estancos),	  a	  Postal	  Office,	  and	  a	  Tax	  Collection
Office	  (alcabala).	  Thus,	  this	  variable	  can	  take	  values	  from	  0	  to	  4.
DESCRIPTIVE	  STATISTICS
All	  Municipalities Colonial	  Gold	  Mines p-­‐value	  for	  t-­‐test	  
for	  equality	  of	  
means
Colonial	  Gold	  Mines	  Neighbors
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Table 2
Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models
Quality	  1 Quality	  2 Quality	  3 Quality	  4 Quality	  5 Quality	  6 Quality	  7 Quality	  8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Colonial	  Gold	  Mines	  Dummy -­‐0.003 -­‐0.001 -­‐0.013 -­‐0.015 0.01 0.02 -­‐0.079 0.082
(0.004) (0.001) (0.017) (0.021) (0.012) (0.046) (0.066) (0.063)
Department	  Fixed	  Effects N N N N N N N N
Observations 354 354 354 354 354 354 354 354
R-­‐squared 0.69 0.50 0.69 0.57 0.65 0.71 0.67 0.67
Agriculture Livestock Conservation Water Valleys Mountains Hills Plains
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Colonial	  Gold	  Mines	  Dummy -­‐0.025 -­‐0.017 0.03 0.013 -­‐0.021 -­‐0.038 0.047 0.000
(0.061) (0.040) (0.056) (0.010) (0.024) (0.048) (0.045) (0.001)
Department	  Fixed	  Effects N N N N N N N N
Observations 354 354 354 354 354 354 354 354
R-­‐squared 0.66 0.6 0.74 0.51 0.68 0.76 0.74 0.54
Standard	  errors	  are	  robust	  to	  arbitrary	  heteroskedasticity.
Constant	  and	  coefficients	  on	  controls	  not	  reported.
Soil	  qualities	  1-­‐8	  are	  classified	  by	  IGAC	  according	  to	  their	  natural	  aptitude	  for	  agriculture	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  
Quality	  1	  soils	  are	  those	  with	  "none	  of	  very	  few	  use	  limitations,	  apt	  for	  crops	  and	  need	  only	  ordinary	  management	  practices	  to	  conserve	  their	  productivity".
Quality	  2	  soils	  are	  those	  with	  "slight	  use	  limitations	  either	  due	  to	  their	  soil,	  topography,	  drainage,	  or	  climate.	  Require	  some	  practices	  to	  avoid	  erosion".
Quality	  3	  soils	  are	  those	  with	  "moderate	  limitations	  due	  to	  soil	  depth,	  erosion,	  fertility,	  slope,	  drainage	  or	  climate.	  They	  require	  intensive	  conservation	  practices".
Quality	  4	  soils	  are	  those	  with	  "severe	  limitations	  due	  to	  steep	  slopes,	  low	  soil	  depth,	  low	  fertility,	  poor	  drainage,	  frequent	  flooding	  or	  saltiness.	  Require	  intensive	  conservation	  practices".
Quality	  5	  soils	  are	  those	  with	  "limitations	  due	  to	  flooding	  or	  rocky	  surfaces	  that	  limit	  usage	  to	  grasslands	  or	  forest".
Quality	  6	  soils	  are	  those	  with	  "permanent	  unalterable	  limitations	  such	  as	  very	  steep	  slopes,	  high	  erosion	  susceptibility,	  rockiness,	  low	  soil	  depth,	  poor	  drainage,	  	  frequent	  flooding,	  low
humidity	  retention,	  excessive	  salt	  or	  sodium.	  Their	  use	  is	  limited	  to	  grasslands	  or	  forest".
Quality	  7	  soils	  are	  those	  with	  "severe	  limitations	  due	  to	  extreme	  slopes,	  low	  soil	  depth,	  rockiness,	  high	  salt	  and/or	  sodium	  contents	  poor	  drainage	  and	  unfavorable	  climate.	  Their	  use
is	  limited	  to	  forest".
Quality	  8	  soils	  are	  those	  with	  "extremely	  severe	  limitations	  due	  to	  soil,	  topography,	  	  drainage	  or	  climate	  that	  limit	  their	  use	  to	  conservation".
Soil	  suitabilities	  and	  topology	  are	  also	  from	  IGAC.
Source:	  Instituto	  Geográfico	  Agustín	  Codazzi	  IGAC	  (n.d.).	  Manual	  para	  el	  Uso	  de	  las	  Estadísticas	  de	  Zonas	  Físicas	  Homogeneas,	  Carreteras	  y	  Suelos.
LAND	  CHARACTERISTICS	  IN	  GOLD-­‐MINE	  AND	  NON-­‐GOLD-­‐MINE	  MUNICIPALITIES:	  OLS	  MODELS
Soil	  Quality	  Shares
Soil	  Suitability	  Shares Topology	  Shares
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Table 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Had Slaves in 1843 15.992 12.401 12.126 10.090 6.533 5.526 5.726 6.340 ‐0.122 ‐0.063 ‐0.100 ‐0.067 ‐0.071 ‐0.064 ‐0.065 ‐0.056
(2.454) (2.748) (2.731) (3.062) (2.940) (3.458) (2.680) (2.993) (0.043) (0.031) (0.042) (0.031) (0.035) (0.031) (0.033) (0.029)
Frac=on of Slaves in 1843 69.246 38.787 25.891 15.564 ‐1.085 ‐0.616 ‐0.198 ‐0.247
(29.349) (37.514) (41.892) (47.515) (0.347) (0.389) (0.431) (0.443)
σξ2 13.374 14.246 9.031 8.366 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
σν2 259.23 261.80 220.47 225.22 0.043 0.044 0.039 0.039
R‐squared 0.482 0.487 0.639 0.639 0.443 0.443 0.560 0.560 0.257 0.272 0.378 0.392 0.200 0.204 0.327 0.330
Geographic Controls N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y
Observa=ons 352 352 352 352 179 179 179 179 336 336 336 336 172 172 172 172
(17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32)
Had Slaves in 1843 ‐0.311 ‐0.229 ‐0.291 ‐0.230 ‐0.139 ‐0.108 ‐0.145 ‐0.105 0.056 0.039 0.033 0.033 0.029 0.027 0.023 0.017
(0.035) (0.036) (0.038) (0.041) (0.034) (0.033) (0.036) (0.037) (0.016) (0.018) (0.014) (0.017) (0.019) (0.021) (0.016) (0.015)
Frac=on of Slaves in 1843 ‐1.561 ‐1.185 ‐0.887 ‐1.035 0.271 0.418 0.394 0.481
(0.401) (0.505) (0.430) (0.522) (0.310) (0.329) (0.320) (0.251)
σξ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
σν2 0.041 0.039 0.040 0.038 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.005
R‐squared 0.333 0.371 0.428 0.457 0.337 0.370 0.389 0.414 0.387 0.429 0.523 0.563 0.314 0.342 0.504 0.539
Geographic Controls N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y
Observa=ons 352 352 352 352 179 179 179 179 248 248 248 248 129 129 129 129
Standard errors for the Neighbor‐Pair Fixed Eﬀects models are robust to arbitrary heteroskedas=city.
Standard errors for the Random Eﬀects models are robust to arbitrary within‐neighborhood heteroskedas=city.
Constant and coeﬃcients on controls not reported.
Geographic controls include: Share of cul=vable land per capita, density of primary rivers, density of secondary rivers, density of ter=ary rivers, distance to the department capital, 
millimeters of annual rainfall, eleva=on above sea level, land area, la=tude, and longitude.
All models include department ﬁxed‐eﬀects.
Par=al R‐squared for the Neighbor‐Pair Fixed Eﬀects models, which excludes the contribu=on of the ﬁxed eﬀects to the ﬁt of the model
LONG‐RUN EFFECT OF SLAVERY ON DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES: OLS MODELS
Poverty Rate 1993
Neighbor‐Pair Fixed Eﬀects Models Random Eﬀects Models Neighbor‐Pair Fixed Eﬀects Models Random Eﬀects Models
Secondary Enrollment Rate Average 1992‐2002
Percent Children Vaccinated 2002 Land Gini 2002
Neighbor‐Pair Fixed Eﬀects Models Random Eﬀects Models Neighbor‐Pair Fixed Eﬀects Models Random Eﬀects Models
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Table 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Colonial	  Gold	  Mines	  Presence 0.378 0.384 0.371 0.237 0.375 0.369 0.363 0.399 0.259 0.400
(0.048) (0.057) (0.061) (0.060) (0.061) (0.065) (0.072) (0.089) (0.083) (0.089)
Colonial	  State	  Presence	  Index,	  1794 0.143 0.146
(0.027) (0.025)
Crown	  Employees,	  1794 0.0026 0.002
(0.0014) (0.0009)
R-­‐squared 0.254 0.352 0.515 0.558 0.520 0.187 0.249 0.415 0.481 0.422
Geographic	  Controls N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y
Quartic	  on	  Geographic	  Controls N N Y Y Y N N Y Y Y
Observations 352 352 348 348 348 179 179 177 177 177
*1st	  stages	  for	  the	  Poverty	  rate	  1993,	  Poverty	  rate	  2005,	  Vaccination	  rate	  2002,	  Electricity	  coverage	  2002,	  and	  Aqueduct	  coverage	  2002	  regression	  samples.
Standard	  errors	  for	  the	  Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  models	  are	  robust	  to	  arbitrary	  heteroskedasticity.
Standard	  errors	  for	  the	  Random	  Effects	  models	  are	  robust	  to	  arbitrary	  within-­‐neighborhood	  heteroskedasticity.
Constant	  and	  coefficients	  on	  controls	  not	  reported.
Geographic	  controls	  include:	  Share	  of	  cultivable	  land	  per	  capita,	  density	  of	  primary	  rivers,	  density	  of	  secondary	  rivers,	  density	  of	  tertiary	  rivers,
distance	  to	  the	  department	  capital,	  	  millimeters	  of	  annual	  rainfall,	  elevation	  above	  sea	  level,	  land	  area,	  latitude,	  and	  longitude.
All	  models	  include	  department	  fixed-­‐effects.
Partial	  R-­‐squared	  for	  the	  Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  models,	  which	  excludes	  the	  contribution	  of	  the	  fixed	  effects	  to	  the	  fit	  of	  the	  model
FIRST	  STAGES	  OF	  THE	  IV	  MODELS:	  SLAVE	  PRESENCE	  ON	  COLONIAL	  GOLD	  MINES	  PRESENCE
Had	  Slaves	  in	  1843*
Random	  Effects	  ModelsNeighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models
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Table 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Had	  Slaves	  in	  1843 12.938 11.356 14.628 13.142 -­‐0.114 -­‐0.087 -­‐0.127 -­‐0.106
(3.929) (3.935) (7.095) (6.892) (0.047) (0.052) (0.063) (0.062)
σξ2 13.374 9.031 0.000 0.000
σν2 259.23 220.47 0.043 0.039
1st	  Stage	  F-­‐statistic 2.190 2.217 3.181 2.345 2.318 2.430 3.069 2.462
p-­‐value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Geographic	  Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y
Observations 352 352 179 179 336 336 172 172
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Had	  Slaves	  in	  1843 -­‐0.249 -­‐0.251 -­‐0.247 -­‐0.254 0.087 0.045 0.048 0.040
(0.066) (0.074) (0.097) (0.107) (0.017) (0.015) (0.024) (0.021)
σξ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
σν2 0.041 0.040 0.007 0.005
1st	  Stage	  F-­‐statistic 2.190 2.217 3.181 2.345 2.312 2.200 3.233 1.963
p-­‐value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.015
Geographic	  Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y
Observations 352 352 179 179 248 248 129 129
Standard	  errors	  for	  the	  Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  models	  are	  robust	  to	  arbitrary	  heteroskedasticity.
Standard	  errors	  for	  the	  Random	  Effects	  models	  are	  robust	  to	  arbitrary	  within-­‐neighborhood	  heteroskedasticity.
Constant	  and	  coefficients	  on	  controls	  not	  reported.
Geographic	  controls	  include:	  Share	  of	  cultivable	  land	  per	  capita,	  density	  of	  primary	  rivers,	  density	  of	  secondary	  rivers,	  density	  of	  tertiary	  rivers,	  distance	  to	  the	  department	  capital,	  
millimeters	  of	  annual	  rainfall,	  elevation	  above	  sea	  level,	  land	  area,	  latitude,	  and	  longitude.
All	  models	  include	  department	  fixed-­‐effects.
Percent	  Children	  Vaccinated	  2002 Land	  Gini	  2002
Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models Random	  Effects	  Models Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models Random	  Effects	  Models
LONG-­‐RUN	  EFFECT	  OF	  SLAVERY	  ON	  DEVELOPMENT	  OUTCOMES:	  IV	  MODELS
Poverty	  Rate	  1993 Secondary	  Enrollment	  Rate	  Average	  1992-­‐2002
Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models Random	  Effects	  Models Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models Random	  Effects	  Models
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Table 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Had	  Slaves	  in	  1843 -­‐0.020 -­‐0.016 -­‐0.010 -­‐0.010 -­‐0.029 -­‐0.017 -­‐0.016 -­‐0.015
(0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.034) (0.034) (0.028) (0.031)
σξ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
σν2 0.001 0.001 0.023 0.020
R-­‐squared 0.379 0.582 0.322 0.532 0.206 0.375 0.162 0.347
Geographic	  Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y
Observations 216 216 111 111 216 216 111 111
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Had	  Slaves	  in	  1843 -­‐0.069 -­‐0.047 -­‐0.033 -­‐0.030 -­‐0.017 -­‐0.013 -­‐0.0074 -­‐0.0062
(0.015) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.006) (0.007) (0.0038) (0.0047)
σξ2 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
σν2 0.011 0.007 0.001 0.001
R-­‐squared 0.487 0.649 0.444 0.638 0.245 0.375 0.221 0.321
Geographic	  Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y
Observations 242 242 123 123 242 242 123 123
Standard	  errors	  for	  the	  Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  models	  are	  robust	  to	  arbitrary	  heteroskedasticity.
Standard	  errors	  for	  the	  Random	  Effects	  models	  are	  robust	  to	  arbitrary	  within-­‐neighborhood	  heteroskedasticity.
Constant	  and	  coefficients	  on	  controls	  not	  reported.
Geographic	  controls	  include:	  Share	  of	  cultivable	  land	  per	  capita,	  density	  of	  primary	  rivers,	  density	  of	  secondary	  rivers,	  density	  of	  tertiary	  rivers,	  distance	  to	  the	  department	  capital,	  
millimeters	  of	  annual	  rainfall,	  elevation	  above	  sea	  level,	  land	  area,	  latitude,	  and	  longitude.
All	  models	  include	  department	  fixed-­‐effects.
Partial	  R-­‐squared	  for	  the	  Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  models,	  which	  excludes	  the	  contribution	  of	  the	  fixed	  effects	  to	  the	  fit	  of	  the	  model
Literacy	  Rate	  1938
Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models Random	  Effects	  Models
Aqueduct	  Coverage	  1938
Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models Random	  Effects	  Models
LONG-­‐RUN	  EFFECT	  OF	  SLAVERY	  ON	  INTERMEDIATE	  DEVELOPMENT	  OUTCOMES:	  OLS	  MODELS
School	  Enrollment	  1918 Vaccine	  Coverage	  1918
Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models Random	  Effects	  Models Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models Random	  Effects	  Models
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Table 7
Panel	  A:	  Second	  Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Had	  Slaves	  in	  1843 -­‐0.017 -­‐0.017 -­‐0.021 -­‐0.022 -­‐0.024 -­‐0.018 -­‐0.043 -­‐0.037
(0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.019) (0.039) (0.039) (0.076) (0.076)
σξ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
σν2 0.001 0.001 0.023 0.020
1st	  Stage	  F-­‐statistic 2.251 2.458 2.883 1.852 2.251 2.458 2.883 1.852
p-­‐value 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.026
Geographic	  Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y
Observations 216 216 111 111 216 216 111 111
Panel	  A:	  Second	  Stage
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Had	  Slaves	  in	  1843 -­‐0.080 -­‐0.065 -­‐0.069 -­‐0.056 -­‐0.029 -­‐0.028 -­‐0.024 -­‐0.024
(0.019) (0.021) (0.030) (0.032) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
σξ2 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
σν2 0.011 0.007 0.001 0.001
1st	  Stage	  F-­‐statistic 1.949 2.286 2.061 1.492 1.949 2.286 2.061 1.492
p-­‐value 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.097 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.097
Geographic	  Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y
Observations 242 242 123 123 242 242 123 123
Standard	  errors	  for	  the	  Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  models	  are	  robust	  to	  arbitrary	  heteroskedasticity.
Standard	  errors	  for	  the	  Random	  Effects	  models	  are	  robust	  to	  arbitrary	  within-­‐neighborhood	  heteroskedasticity.
Constant	  and	  coefficients	  on	  controls	  not	  reported.
Geographic	  controls	  include:	  Share	  of	  cultivable	  land	  per	  capita,	  density	  of	  primary	  rivers,	  density	  of	  secondary	  rivers,	  density	  of	  tertiary	  rivers,	  distance	  to	  the	  department	  capital,	  
millimeters	  of	  annual	  rainfall,	  elevation	  above	  sea	  level,	  land	  area,	  latitude,	  and	  longitude.
All	  models	  include	  department	  fixed-­‐effects.
Literacy	  Rate	  1938
Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models Random	  Effects	  Models
Aqueduct	  Coverage	  1938
Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models Random	  Effects	  Models
LONG-­‐RUN	  EFFECT	  OF	  SLAVERY	  ON	  INTERMEDIATE	  DEVELOPMENT	  OUTCOMES:	  IV	  MODELS
School	  Enrollment	  1918 Vaccine	  Coverage	  1918
Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models Random	  Effects	  Models Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models Random	  Effects	  Models
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Table 8
Had	  Slaves	  in	  1843 1.000
Colonial	  State	  Presence	  Index,	  1794 0.406 1.000
Crown	  Employees,	  1794 0.098 0.327 1.000
Obs:	  177
SLAVERY	  AND	  COLONIAL	  STATE	  PRESENCE:	  CORRELATIONS
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Table 9
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Had	  Slaves	  in	  1843 13.972 15.484 14.362 5.786 6.938 6.148 -­‐0.116 -­‐0.141 -­‐0.122 -­‐0.057 -­‐0.078 -­‐0.065
(3.497) (3.608) (3.517) (3.431) (3.407) (3.378) (0.046) (0.055) (0.046) (0.044) (0.048) (0.045)
Colonial	  State	  Presence	  Index,	  1794 -­‐1.029 -­‐1.199 0.019 0.022
(1.401) (1.406) (0.020) (0.019)
Crown	  Employees,	  1794 -­‐0.099 -­‐0.069 0.002 0.001
(0.040) (0.030) (0.001) (0.0003)
σξ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
σν2 195.71 195.81 194.63 0.04 0.04 0.04
R-­‐squared 0.742 0.742 0.744 0.676 0.678 0.680 0.504 0.505 0.515 0.431 0.437 0.446
Quartic	  on	  Geographic	  Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 348 348 348 177 177 177 332 332 332 170 170 170
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
Had	  Slaves	  in	  1843 -­‐0.308 -­‐0.280 -­‐0.312 -­‐0.169 -­‐0.153 -­‐0.169 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.011 0.007 0.011
(0.045) (0.058) (0.046) (0.044) (0.046) (0.045) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Colonial	  State	  Presence	  Index,	  1794 -­‐0.019 -­‐0.016 0.000 0.005
(0.023) (0.024) (0.008) (0.007)
Crown	  Employees,	  1794 0.001 0.000 -­‐0.0001 0.0001
(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
σξ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
σν2 0.039 0.04 0.04 0.005 0.005 0.005
R-­‐squared 0.528 0.541 0.529 0.469 0.472 0.469 0.685 0.687 0.685 0.662 0.663 0.662
Quartic	  on	  Geographic	  Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 348 348 348 177 177 177 244 244 244 127 127 127
Standard	  errors	  for	  the	  Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  models	  are	  robust	  to	  arbitrary	  heteroskedasticity.
Standard	  errors	  for	  the	  Random	  Effects	  models	  are	  robust	  to	  arbitrary	  within-­‐neighborhood	  heteroskedasticity.
Constant	  and	  coefficients	  on	  controls	  not	  reported.
Geographic	  controls	  include:	  Share	  of	  cultivable	  land	  per	  capita,	  density	  of	  primary	  rivers,	  density	  of	  secondary	  rivers,	  density	  of	  tertiary	  rivers,	  distance	  to	  the	  department	  capital,	  
millimeters	  of	  annual	  rainfall,	  elevation	  above	  sea	  level,	  land	  area,	  latitude,	  and	  longitude.
All	  models	  include	  department	  fixed-­‐effects.
Partial	  R-­‐squared	  for	  the	  Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  models,	  which	  excludes	  the	  contribution	  of	  the	  fixed	  effects	  to	  the	  fit	  of	  the	  model
Percent	  Children	  Vaccinated	  2002 Land	  Gini	  2002
Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models Random	  Effects	  Models Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models Random	  Effects	  Models
LONG-­‐RUN	  EFFECT	  OF	  SLAVERY	  ON	  DEVELOPMENT	  OUTCOMES:	  OLS	  MODELS	  WITH	  ADDITIONAL	  CONTROLS
Poverty	  Rate	  1993 Secondary	  Enrollment	  Rate	  Average	  1992-­‐2002
Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models Random	  Effects	  Models Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models Random	  Effects	  Models
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Table 10
Panel	  A:	  Second	  Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Had	  Slaves	  in	  1843 12.752 22.330 12.551 11.885 20.774 11.872 -­‐0.089 -­‐0.146 -­‐0.084 -­‐0.091 -­‐0.167 -­‐0.090
(4.872) (8.118) (3.753) (6.736) (10.553) (5.371) (0.053) (0.056) (0.051) (0.058) (0.071) (0.058)
Colonial	  State	  Presence	  Index,	  1794 -­‐3.782 -­‐3.758 0.024 0.034
(1.863) (2.238) (0.012) (0.016)
Crown	  Employees,	  1794 -­‐0.043 -­‐0.039 0.001 0.001
(0.037) (0.024) (0.0004) (0.0002)
σξ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
σν2 195.71 195.81 194.63 0.038 0.038 0.037
1st	  Stage	  F-­‐statistic 2.651 3.257 2.674 2.408 3.046 2.408 2.807 3.262 2.810 2.349 2.939 2.350
p-­‐value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Quartic	  on	  Geographic	  Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 348 348 348 177 177 177 332 332 332 170 170 170
Panel	  A:	  Second	  Stage
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
Had	  Slaves	  in	  1843 -­‐0.259 -­‐0.414 -­‐0.256 -­‐0.231 -­‐0.360 -­‐0.231 0.073 0.128 0.073 0.037 0.040 0.037
(0.081) (0.123) (0.052) (0.106) (0.147) (0.070) (0.021) (0.041) (0.021) (0.022) (0.031) (0.022)
Colonial	  State	  Presence	  Index,	  1794 0.061 0.054 -­‐0.020 -­‐0.001
(0.025) (0.029) (0.008) (0.006)
Crown	  Employees,	  1794 0.001 0.0004 -­‐0.0001 0.0000
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001)
σξ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
σν2 0.039 0.0389 0.0392 0.005 0.0046 0.0046
1st	  Stage	  F-­‐statistic 2.651 3.257 2.674 2.408 3.046 2.408 2.416 2.842 2.389 1.594 1.922 1.577
p-­‐value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.006 0.041
Quartic	  on	  Geographic	  Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 348 348 348 177 177 177 244 244 244 127 127 127
Standard	  errors	  for	  the	  Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  models	  are	  robust	  to	  arbitrary	  heteroskedasticity.
Standard	  errors	  for	  the	  Random	  Effects	  models	  are	  robust	  to	  arbitrary	  within-­‐neighborhood	  heteroskedasticity.
Constant	  and	  coefficients	  on	  controls	  not	  reported.
Geographic	  controls	  include:	  Share	  of	  cultivable	  land	  per	  capita,	  density	  of	  primary	  rivers,	  density	  of	  secondary	  rivers,	  density	  of	  tertiary	  rivers,	  distance	  to	  the	  department	  capital,	  
millimeters	  of	  annual	  rainfall,	  elevation	  above	  sea	  level,	  land	  area,	  latitude,	  and	  longitude.
All	  models	  include	  department	  fixed-­‐effects.
Percent	  Children	  Vaccinated	  2002 Land	  Gini	  2002
Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models Random	  Effects	  Models Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models Random	  Effects	  Models
LONG-­‐RUN	  EFFECT	  OF	  SLAVERY	  ON	  DEVELOPMENT	  OUTCOMES:	  IV	  MODELS	  WITH	  ADDITIONAL	  CONTROLS
Poverty	  Rate	  1993 Secondary	  Enrollment	  Rate	  Average	  1992-­‐2002
Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models Random	  Effects	  Models Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models Random	  Effects	  Models
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Figure 2
Source: West (1952).
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Figure 3
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Appendix 1: Random Effects Correlation Structure
As a simple illustration, if the sample had 2 gold-mine municipalities g1 and g2, {a, b, c} share a border
with g1 and {a, c, d, e} share a border with g2, then M(a) = M(c) = {g1, g2}, M(b) = {g1}, and
M(d) = M(e) = {g2}. In this case, the Random Effects covariance matrix would take the form:
Ω =

g1 a b c g2 d e
g1 σ
2
ξ + σ
2
ν σ
2
ξ σ
2
ξ σ
2
ξ 0 0 0
a σ2ξ 2σ
2
ξ + σ
2
ν σ
2
ξ 2σ
2
ξ σ
2
ξ σ
2
ξ σ
2
ξ
b σ2ξ σ
2
ξ σ
2
ξ + σ
2
ν σ
2
ξ 0 0 0
c σ2ξ 2σ
2
ξ σ
2
ξ 2σ
2
ξ + σ
2
ν σ
2
ξ σ
2
ξ σ
2
ξ
g2 0 σ2ξ 0 σ
2
ξ σ
2
ξ + σ
2
ν σ
2
ξ σ
2
ξ
d 0 σ2ξ 0 σ
2
ξ σ
2
ξ σ
2
ξ + σ
2
ν σ
2
ξ
e 0 σ2ξ 0 σ
2
ξ σ
2
ξ σ
2
ξ σ
2
ξ + σ
2
ν

The feasible random effects estimator requires prior estimation of Ω. Given the covariance structure
of the unobservables, σ2ξ and σ
2
ν can be estimated as follows:
σˆ2ξ =
|N |+ |M |
|N |+ |M | −K
( ∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N,j 6=i uˆiuˆj∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N,j 6=i |M(i) ∩M(j)|
+
∑
i∈N
∑
g∈M(i) uˆiuˆg∑
i∈N M(i)
)
(10)
where K is the number of covariates. The term |N |+|M ||N |+|M |−K is a degrees-of-freedom adjustment.
Now define a to be the sum of the diagonal of Ω. Thus,
a ≡ (|N |+ |M |)σ2ν +
(
|M |+
∑
i∈N
|M(i)|
)
σ2ξ (11)
By defining aˆ to be the empirical analogous of a,
aˆ =
∑
s
uˆ2s (12)
We can use the definition of a to solve for σ2ν :
σ2ν =
a− (|M |+∑i∈N |M(i)|)σ2ξ
|N |+ |M | (13)
Replacing (10) and (12) in (13), we obtain an estimate of σ2ν :
σˆ2ν =
|N |+ |M |
|N |+ |M | −K
aˆ− (|M |+∑i∈N |M(i)|) (σˆ2ξ |N |+|M |−k|N |+|M | )
|N |+ |M | (14)
Thus, the estimated variance matrix Ωˆ uses equations (10) and (14) in Ω.
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Appendix 2
Table A2.1
Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects Random	  Effects Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects Random	  Effects Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects Random	  Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Had	  Slaves	  in	  1843 5.117 2.753 -­‐12.698 -­‐3.713 -­‐12.746 -­‐6.925
(2.549) (3.306) (3.292) (2.476) (3.413) (2.549)
σξ2 31.823 0.000 0.000
σν2 318.51 240.47 268.98
R-­‐squared 0.640 0.543 0.641 0.599 0.617 0.560
Geographic	  Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 352 179 352 179 352 179
Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects Random	  Effects Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects Random	  Effects Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects Random	  Effects
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Had	  Slaves	  in	  1843 0.005 -­‐0.025 0.001 0.000 -­‐0.012 -­‐0.008
(0.025) (0.022) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.0057)
σξ2 0.001 0.000 0.000
σν2 0.008 0.0004 0.001
R-­‐squared 0.582 0.532 0.250 0.194 0.341 0.308
Geographic	  Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 216 111 242 123 242 123
Standard	  errors	  for	  the	  Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  models	  are	  robust	  to	  arbitrary	  heteroskedasticity.
Standard	  errors	  for	  the	  Random	  Effects	  models	  are	  robust	  to	  arbitrary	  within-­‐neighborhood	  heteroskedasticity.
Constant	  and	  coefficients	  on	  controls	  not	  reported.
Geographic	  controls	  include:	  Share	  of	  cultivable	  land	  per	  capita,	  density	  of	  primary	  rivers,	  density	  of	  secondary	  rivers,	  density	  of	  tertiary	  rivers,	  distance	  to	  the	  department	  capital,	  
millimeters	  of	  annual	  rainfall,	  elevation	  above	  sea	  level,	  land	  area,	  latitude,	  and	  longitude.
All	  models	  include	  department	  fixed-­‐effects.
Partial	  R-­‐squared	  for	  the	  Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  models,	  which	  excludes	  the	  contribution	  of	  the	  fixed	  effects	  to	  the	  fit	  of	  the	  model
Literacy	  Rate	  1918 Sewage	  Coverage	  1938
Aquedcut	  Coverage	  2002
Electricity	  Coverage	  1938
LONG-­‐RUN	  EFFECT	  OF	  SLAVERY	  ON	  ADDITIONAL	  DEVELOPMENT	  OUTCOMES:	  OLS	  MODELS
Poverty	  Rate	  2005 Electricity	  Coverage	  2002
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Table A2.2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Colonial	  Gold	  Mines	  Presence 0.378 0.384 0.369 0.363 0.339 0.350 0.360 0.374
(0.048) (0.057) (0.065) (0.072) (0.048) (0.058) (0.065) (0.075)
R-­‐squared 0.254 0.352 0.187 0.249 0.249 0.359 0.188 0.267
Geographic	  Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y
Observations 352 352 179 179 336 336 172 172
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Colonial	  Gold	  Mines	  Presence 0.329 0.339 0.321 0.272 0.309 0.300 0.350 0.357
(0.058) (0.065) (0.084) (0.083) (0.056) (0.064) (0.079) (0.081)
R-­‐squared 0.299 0.383 0.224 0.292 0.260 0.351 0.170 0.237
Geographic	  Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y
Observations 216 216 111 111 242 242 123 123
(17) (18) (19) (20)
Colonial	  Gold	  Mines	  Presence 0.369 0.370 0.380 0.384
(0.054) (0.064) (0.070) (0.082)
R-­‐squared 0.304 0.376 0.215 0.267
Geographic	  Controls N Y N Y
Observations 248 248 129 129
*1st	  stages	  for	  the	  Poverty	  rate	  1993,	  Poverty	  rate	  2005,	  Vaccination	  rate	  2002,	  Electricity	  coverage	  2002,	  and	  Aqueduct	  coverage	  2002	  regression	  samples.
**1st	  stage	  for	  the	  Secondary	  Enrollment	  rate	  1992-­‐2002	  regressions	  sample.
***1st	  stage	  for	  the	  1918	  regressions	  sample.
****1st	  stage	  for	  the	  1938	  regressions	  sample.
*****1st	  stage	  for	  the	  Land	  Gini	  2002	  regressions	  sample.
Standard	  errors	  for	  the	  Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  models	  are	  robust	  to	  arbitrary	  heteroskedasticity.
Standard	  errors	  for	  the	  Random	  Effects	  models	  are	  robust	  to	  arbitrary	  within-­‐neighborhood	  heteroskedasticity.
Constant	  and	  coefficients	  on	  controls	  not	  reported.
Geographic	  controls	  include:	  Share	  of	  cultivable	  land	  per	  capita,	  density	  of	  primary	  rivers,	  density	  of	  secondary	  rivers,	  density	  of	  tertiary	  rivers,
distance	  to	  the	  department	  capital,	  	  millimeters	  of	  annual	  rainfall,	  elevation	  above	  sea	  level,	  land	  area,	  latitude,	  and	  longitude.
All	  models	  include	  department	  fixed-­‐effects.
Partial	  R-­‐squared	  for	  the	  Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  models,	  which	  excludes	  the	  contribution	  of	  the	  fixed	  effects	  to	  the	  fit	  of	  the	  model
FIRST	  STAGES	  OF	  THE	  IV	  MODELS:	  SLAVE	  PRESENCE	  ON	  COLONIAL	  GOLD	  MINES	  PRESENCE
Had	  Slaves	  in	  1843* Had	  Slaves	  in	  1843**
Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models Random	  Effects	  Models Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models Random	  Effects	  Models
Had	  Slaves	  in	  1843*****
Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models Random	  Effects	  Models
Had	  Slaves	  in	  1843*** Had	  Slaves	  in	  1843****
Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models Random	  Effects	  Models Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models Random	  Effects	  Models
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Table A2.3
Panel	  A:	  Second	  Stage Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects Random	  Effects Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects Random	  Effects Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects Random	  Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Had	  Slaves	  in	  1843 5.388 7.307 -­‐7.541 -­‐7.179 -­‐9.792 -­‐11.036
(3.301) (5.848) (3.510) (5.736) (3.714) (6.108)
σξ2 31.823 0.000 0.000
σν2 318.51 240.47 268.98
1st	  Stage	  F-­‐statistic 2.217 2.345 2.217 2.345 2.217 2.345
p-­‐value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
Geographic	  Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 352 179 352 179 352 179
Panel	  A:	  Second	  Stage Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects Random	  Effects Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects Random	  Effects Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects Random	  Effects
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Had	  Slaves	  in	  1843 0.031 0.010 -­‐0.009 -­‐0.009 -­‐0.022 -­‐0.020
(0.026) (0.050) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012)
σξ2 0.001 0.000 0.000
σν2 0.008 0.0004 0.001
1st	  Stage	  F-­‐statistic 2.458 1.852 2.286 1.492 2.286 1.492
p-­‐value 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.097 0.000 0.097
Geographic	  Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 216 111 242 123 242 123
Standard	  errors	  for	  the	  Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  models	  are	  robust	  to	  arbitrary	  heteroskedasticity.
Standard	  errors	  for	  the	  Random	  Effects	  models	  are	  robust	  to	  arbitrary	  within-­‐neighborhood	  heteroskedasticity.
Constant	  and	  coefficients	  on	  controls	  not	  reported.
Geographic	  controls	  include:	  Share	  of	  cultivable	  land	  per	  capita,	  density	  of	  primary	  rivers,	  density	  of	  secondary	  rivers,	  density	  of	  tertiary	  rivers,	  distance	  to	  the	  department	  capital,	  
millimeters	  of	  annual	  rainfall,	  elevation	  above	  sea	  level,	  land	  area,	  latitude,	  and	  longitude.
All	  models	  include	  department	  fixed-­‐effects.
LONG-­‐RUN	  EFFECT	  OF	  SLAVERY	  ON	  ADDITIONAL	  DEVELOPMENT	  OUTCOMES:	  IV	  MODELS
Poverty	  Rate	  2005 Electricity	  Coverage	  2002 Aquedcut	  Coverage	  2002
Electricity	  Coverage	  1938Literacy	  Rate	  1918 Sewage	  Coverage	  1938
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Table A2.4
Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Colonial	  Gold	  Mines	  Dummy -­‐0.006 -­‐0.017 0.065 0.056 -­‐0.017 0.003 -­‐0.049 -­‐0.029
(0.015) (0.012) (0.049) (0.054) (0.032) (0.049) (0.021) (0.023)
Department	  Fixed	  Effects N Y N Y N Y N Y
Quartic	  on	  Geographic	  Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y
Observations 364 358 364 358 364 358 364 358
R-­‐squared 0.53 0.73 0.56 0.73 0.69 0.84 0.6 0.77
Standard	  errors	  are	  robust	  to	  arbitrary	  heteroskedasticity.
Constant	  and	  coefficients	  on	  controls	  not	  reported.
Geographic	  controls	  include:	  Share	  of	  cultivable	  land	  per	  capita,	  density	  of	  primary	  rivers,	  density	  of	  secondary	  rivers,	  density	  of	  tertiary	  rivers,
distance	  to	  the	  department	  capital,	  millimeters	  of	  annual	  rainfall,	  elevation	  above	  sea	  level,	  land	  area,	  latitude,	  and	  longitude.
The	  quartic	  polynomials	  include	  distance	  to	  the	  department	  capital,	  millimeters	  of	  annual	  rainfall,	  elevation	  above	  sea	  level,	  land	  area,	  latitude,	  and	  longitude.
SECTORAL	  COMPOSITION	  OF	  EMPLOYMENT	  IN	  GOLD-­‐MINE	  AND	  NON-­‐GOLD-­‐MINE	  MUNICIPALITIES:	  OLS	  MODELS
Employment	  Share	  2008
Agriculture Mining Manufacturing Government	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Table A2.5
Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Had	  Slaves	  in	  1843 -­‐0.005 -­‐0.010 -­‐0.009 0.022 0.028 0.030
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.028) (0.034) (0.039)
Geographic	  Controls N Y Y N Y Y
Quartic	  on	  Geographic	  Controls N N Y N N Y
Observations 364 364 358 364 364 358
R-­‐squared 0.60 0.66 0.73 0.64 0.66 0.72
Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Effects	  Models
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Had	  Slaves	  in	  1843 -­‐0.008 -­‐0.006 0.001 0.022 0.017 0.016
(0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.022) (0.026)
Geographic	  Controls N Y Y N Y Y
Quartic	  on	  Geographic	  Controls N N Y N N Y
Observations 364 364 358 364 364 358
R-­‐squared 0.75 0.77 0.84 0.59 0.74 0.77
Standard	  errors	  for	  the	  Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  models	  are	  robust	  to	  arbitrary	  heteroskedasticity.
Constant	  and	  coefficients	  on	  controls	  not	  reported.
Geographic	  controls	  include:	  Share	  of	  cultivable	  land	  per	  capita,	  density	  of	  primary	  rivers,	  density	  of	  secondary	  rivers,	  density	  of	  tertiary	  
rivers,	  distance	  to	  the	  department	  capital,	  millimeters	  of	  annual	  rainfall,	  elevation	  above	  sea	  level,	  land	  area,	  latitude,	  and	  longitude.
All	  models	  include	  department	  fixed-­‐effects.
EFFECT	  OF	  SLAVERY	  INTENSITY	  ON	  EMPLOYMENT	  STRUCTURE:	  OLS	  MODELS
Agriculture	  Employment	  Share	  2008 Mining	  Employment	  Share	  2008
Effect	  of	  Slavery	  Intensity	  on	  Employment	  Structure
Manufacturing	  Employment	  Share	  2008 Government	  Employment	  Share	  2008
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Table A2.6
Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  Models
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Had	  Slaves	  in	  1843 17,164.8 16,825.9 8,602.9 -­‐0.135 -­‐0.288 -­‐0.076 -­‐0.036 -­‐0.027 -­‐0.024
(5,117.3) (4,957.3) (5,521.7) (0.340) (0.337) (0.319) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013)
Geographic	  Controls N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Quartic	  on	  Geographic	  Controls N N Y N N Y N N Y
Observations 352 352 352 348 348 348 340 340 340
R-­‐squared 0.65 0.74 0.80 0.67 0.72 0.77 0.74 0.76 0.81
Standard	  errors	  for	  the	  Neighbor-­‐Pair	  Fixed	  Effects	  models	  are	  robust	  to	  arbitrary	  heteroskedasticity.
Constant	  and	  coefficients	  on	  controls	  not	  reported.
Geographic	  controls	  include:	  Share	  of	  cultivable	  land	  per	  capita,	  density	  of	  primary	  rivers,	  density	  of	  secondary	  rivers,	  density	  of	  tertiary	  
rivers,	  distance	  to	  the	  department	  capital,	  millimeters	  of	  annual	  rainfall,	  elevation	  above	  sea	  level,	  land	  area,	  latitude,	  and	  longitude.
All	  models	  include	  department	  fixed-­‐effects.
EFFECT	  OF	  SLAVERY	  INTENSITY	  ON	  STATE	  CAPACITY	  OUTCOMES:	  OLS	  MODELS	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Per	  Capita	  Tax	  Collection	  2002 Per	  Capita	  Municipality	  Employees	  1995 Per	  1000	  Police	  Posts	  1995
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